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I. INTRODUCTION
The last dozen or so years have witnessed a renaissance in theorizing
about some perennial questions of constitutional law: What are proper princi-
ples of constitutional interpretation, and what use do those principles make of
the "intent" of "the Framers," the "meaning" of the words the Framers
employed, and post-ratification changes in social circumstances and in
empirical and philosophical opinion? What are the proper roles of the legisla-
tures and courts in interpreting and applying various constitutional provi-
sions? What are the proper sources for the ethical norms that courts (and
legislatures) must resort to under certain constitutional provisions?
John Ely's much and deservedly heralded book, Democracy andDistrust,'
a book whose coming was foretold by a flurry of major law review articles,2
deals with these questions. Moreover, it deals with them quite brilliantly,
marking it as perhaps the most important theoretical work among the recent
ones.3 Nonetheless, despite its brilliance, Ely's book fails as the definitive
treatment of constitutional theory. Many obvious and not so obvious ques-
tions and objections are raised by Ely's "answers" to the perennial prob-
lems-questions and objections that are not dealt with satisfactorily in the
book or in Ely's prior articles.
Many of the questions and objections provoked by Ely's book will no
doubt be raised by others, including the contributors to this Symposium. 4 My
ambition in this Article is to map out at least part of the terrain of constitu-
tional theory and to plot both Ely's and the other modem theorists' positions
on that map. My hope is that by doing so I will make it easier to perceive the
*This Article is thus a member of that species described by Professor Leon Lipson of Yale Law School as
**Anything you can do, I can do meta." That gem was saved for posterity by Lipson's colleague, Arthur Left.
Leff. Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 n.2. Some readers may feel after reading
this Article that Lipson's put-down was quite warranted; many of us are shamelessly undeterred by it nonethe-
less.
.*Professor of Law. University of San Diego. B.A., Williams College, 1965; L.L.B.. Yale University, 1968.
I. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY].
2. Ely's recent articles whose major themes found their way into his book are The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); The Centrality and Limits of Motivation
Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155 (1978); Constitutional Interpretivisin: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53
IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1978); Toward a
Representation--Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978).
3. On the other hand. Laurence Tribe's treatise, while short on the issues of constitutional interpretation
and judicial review, does deal brilliantly with substantive value questions. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1978).
4. Michael Perry has raised many in his forthcoming book, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS. See also Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Cnsdtu-
tio,,al Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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relation of Ely's positions to the others', easier to perceive the difficulties with
the various positions, and, most importantly, easier to perceive which theo-
retical issues must be resolved first before others can be resolved. My con-
tention is that constitutional theory remains in unsatisfactory condition, not
just because the Supreme Court has done sloppy work (though it has), but
also because the commentators have opted to skirt theoretical issues that are
logically prior to the topics that have been their primary concern.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Interpretivism, Noninterpretivism, and the Relation of
Meaning and Authority
If Ely's book attains the prominence I predict for it, part of the credit
must go to Raoul Berger, a true gadfly of constitutional theory, and especially
his book, Government by Judiciary.5 Berger has forced all serious constitu-
tional theorists to deal with questions regarding proper principles of constitu-
tional interpretation and the proper role of the courts, questions that many
theorists, basking in the warm glow of Warren Court decisions on individual
rights, felt content to ignore.6 Berger has quite convincingly demonstrated
that the bulk of modern judicial decisions under the fourteenth amendment
cannot be justified by reference to what the drafters of that amendment be-
lieved the amendment would accomplish. Moreover, Berger has argued with
great force that judicial decisions that cannot be justified by what the constitu-
tional Framers specifically intended are illegitimate in a democracy.7 The title
of his book is thus for Berger both a description of reality and of tyranny.
Berger's challenge to the pedigree of modern fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence has sent some scholars scurrying to unearth conflicting histori-
cal evidence of the Framers' intent." Others have accepted Berger's picture of
the role assumed by the judiciary but have rejected Berger's contention that
such a role is illegitimate in our democracy. 9 Still others, like Ely, have
divided the Constitution into provisions that embody the norms of the
Framers and provisions that represent delegations to the courts to supply
norms. In applying the former provisions, "interpretivism"1 0 is the proper
5. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
6. Ely was not one of those theorists. See Ely, The Wages of Chying Wolft A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
7. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 407-18 (1977). See also Bork. Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendmtent Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971)
8. See, e.g., Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651
(1979). See also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theor',
67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1088-95 (1979); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 204 (1980); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1029 (1977); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1978).
10. *'Interpretivism'" is Ely's neologism. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility,
53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978). Brest refers to the same concept as "'originalism." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
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judicial technique. In applying the latter provisions, because there are no
norms to "interpret," the judicial technique employed in fleshing out the
provisions is "noninterpretivism."
In my opinion, the Berger-inspired revival of attention to principles of
interpretation and the role of interpretation in constitutional law, as salutary
as it has been, has not been sufficiently theoretically sophisticated for ulti-
mately resolving the interpretation issues. Not a single theorist has presented
anything like a full-blown theory of what "interpretation" really is and
whether "interpretation" of a legal document is an ethically neutral tech-
nique or is at least partially ethically freighted. We are still lacking even a
rudimentary theory of legal and particularly constitutional hermeneutics."
Let me explain.
1. Interpretation
What are we doing when we say we are "interpreting" some categorical
command another has given us? The command can be oral or written. It can
be in an instrument described as a constitution, a statute, a contract, a will, a
trust, and so forth. I will assume, in order to avoid obvious complications,
that the author of the command is a single person, not a collective body like a
legislature, a constitutional convention, or a labor union.
One thing that seems absolutely clear is that, whatever else we are doing,
we are not "interpreting" the command if we pay no heed to the identity and
circumstances of its author. Symbols on a page or sounds have no "meaning"
to interpret in the abstract. 2 We need to know that the symbols or sounds
were made by human beings who purported to be communicating before we
become concerned with the symbols' or sounds' meaning. (The marks "dog"
in the sand do not refer to a four-legged domestic mammal if they were made
by the waves.) We need to know the language they were employing. (The
symbols "canard" do not refer to an untruth if the language of the symbol
user was French and not English.) And we need to know something about the
11. Insofar as constitutional hermeneutics is concerned, the best theoretical works in my estimation are
those of Brest and Munzer-and-Nickel. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1029 (1977). But Brest and Munzer-and-Nickel are noninterpretivists who therefore need not ultimately
decide the nature of constitutional interpretation. One book, devoted entirely to a study of constitutional
language, disclaims any intention to resolve the proper meaning of constitutional interpretation. See J.
BRIGHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE 16-17 (1978). On legal hermeneutics in general, see W. BISHIN & C.
STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 473-538 (1972); P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECI-
SIONMAKING 36-44 (1975); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-15 (1921); R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OFTHE LAW 172-73 (1921); L. HAND, THE BILLOF RIGHTS 18-25 (1958); H. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 121-23 (1961); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958); W. PROBERT, LAW,
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1972); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527
(1947); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958);
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966).
12. See L. COHEN, THE DIVERSITY OF MEANING 3 (1962); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution
Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1043-44 (1977).
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communicator's purposes. (The injunction to "drive carefully" does not
carry the same meaning on the first tee as it does on the highway.)
One way perhaps to look at interpretation is to view it as the answer that
the author of the command would give if the interpreter asked, with respect to
a case before him, "Does your command cover this case, and, if so, how does
it direct me to resolve it?" 3 Thus, Raoul Berger would say that, as he inter-
prets "equal protection of the laws," it covers only official racial discrimina-
tion of the type exemplified by the Black Codes and outlawed by the 1866
Civil Rights Act, and it does not outlaw "separate-but-equal" racial segrega-
tion of schools. 14 One reason for Berger's conclusion is that he believes, based
on his historical evidence, that had the Framers been asked at the time they
were enacting the fourteenth amendment, "Does your amendment outlaw
discrimination against women, or outlaw racial segregation of schools?," they
would have answered, "No."
Is our concept of interpretation at root based upon the model of a hypo-
thetical question directed at the author of the communication that is to be
interpreted? If so, then several further problems must be dealt with to under-
stand interpretation fully. First, is it possible for the author of the command to
be mistaken in his hypothetical answer to the hypothetical question? More
specifically, is it conceptually possible that the words he has chosen do not
carry, as opposed to carry inartfully, the meaning he attributes to them? Paul
Brest suggests that, just as the purposes of the author influence the "mean-
ing" of the words, so too do the words and their dictionary "meanings"
restrict the range of purposes that can be attributed to those words. 15 Thus, an
author might "misinterpret" his own command. I wonder.
Second, what is the role in such a hypothetical question and answer
technique of the command's author's factual errors? Suppose he "answers"
that equal protection does not cover racially segregated schools because
racially segregated schools can be equal, and we believe we could show him
that racially segregated schools cannot, as a matter offact, be equal. Do we
properly "interpret" equal protection when we apply it as we believe the
Framers would have wanted had they had the same factual beliefs that we
have, and not the mistaken factual beliefs they did have? If so, what do we do
with a constitutional provision that would never have been enacted but for a
factual mistake?
16
13. For discussion of interpretation as a hypothetical question addressed to the author of the command in
question, see Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 31 i,
334 (1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209-12,
222-23 (1980).
14. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 191-92 (1977).
15. P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 44 (1975). See also Brest, The Mis-
conceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). In the latter article Brest divides
interpretation into two modes, "textualism" and "intensionalism." Id. at 205, 209. Because the linguistic and
social contexts are relevant to interpretation in the textualist mode, id. at 206, I think that whatever differences
there are between the two modes are relatively insignificant. But see id. at 223: "Strict textualism and inten-
tionalism are not synergistic, but rather mutually antagonistic approaches to interpretation.'"
16. Consider the origins of the impairment of contracts clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1) and the
treatment of those origins in Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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Third, what is the role in such a hypothetical question and answer tech-
nique of a normative "mistake" by the author of the command? Suppose we
believe that the conception of justice held by the Framers of the fourteenth
amendment, which conception they sought to embody in that amendment, is
inferior to, say, that of John Rawls. Moreover, suppose we believe that upon
reading Rawls' arguments, the Framers would have been convinced by them
and would have given the fourteenth amendment a distinctly Rawlsian flavor.
If we hold those beliefs, then are we properly "interpreting" the fourteenth
amendment when we in fact do give it a Rawlsian flavor?
17
Another way of looking at the second and third questions regarding
factual and normative mistakes is to view them as asking, "At what level of
generality of purpose do we interpret what the Framers of the Constitution
have done?" At the highest level of generality, the Framers intended "to
promote wise and just government." At that level of generality of interpreta-
tion, nothing the Framers did can be deemed to have been mistaken, since it is
never a "mistake" to promote wise and just government. By the same token,
however, there is little utility in having a written constitution and in knowing
who the Framers were and their circumstances if whatever is written is "in-
terpreted" as "promote wise and just government (as you, the interpreter,
conceive of it)." On the other hand, if we choose a very low level of generality
at which to express the Framers' purposes, one that is about as specific as
the words' denotations for the Framers, we may have to give effect to some
very silly and obvious mistakes.' 8
17. There has been a lively debate over interpreting the Constitution to embody the moral theory of John
Rawls, John Stuart Mill, or one's alternative philosophical favorite when it is clear that the Framers would not
have endorsed the views of those philosophers, at least without argument. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, 130-49 (1977); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 39-56 (1977). See also Greena-
walt, Comments to Chapters 2 and3, in THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 86, 89-90 (L. Theberge
ed. 1979). But see Bayles, Morality and the Constitution, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561; Gerety, Pornography and
Violence, 40 U. PHT. L. REV. 627, 643 (1979); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117 (1978); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1037-41 (1977).
18. See generally W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS 502-38 (1972); P. BREST,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 15-44, 103-14, 145-69 (1975), Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209-11, 216-17, 220-21 (esp. n.64)(1980). The
works just cited contain many useful illustrations of the problem of determining the proper level of generality of
"'intent" for interpretation. I often illustrate the problem in class through such commonplace examples concern-
ing interpreting directives as the following:
You give a friend your check book and tell her that you would like her to go out and buy you ajar of
curry powder, as you have your heart set on curry for your dinner tonight. She returns late in the
afternoon with ajar of curry powder, but you notice that the check she wrote was for$3.000! After you
gain control of yourself, you ask her how she spent $3,000 of your money. She replies that there is a
shortage of curry powder, the jar she bought was the last one in stock in town. and the grocer refused
to sell it for less than $3,000. Because you said you had your heart set on curry, and because you did
have $3,000 in the bank. she bought the jar.
The alternative version of the story has your friend returning with alfalfa sprouts. You ask her why
she bought sprouts and not curry powder, and she replies that although your specific intent was to have
curry, your more general intent was to have a good meal, and your even more general intent was to get
pleasure from life; and if you begin now cultivating a taste for alfalfa sprouts, your life will ultimately
contain more pleasure.
In both cases I claim that you have been misinterpreted. In the first version. the alternative
account is to say your friend properly interpreted your directive but unreasonably adhered to it. I
1981l]
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Fourth, what is the role of the various "canons" of interpretation? Are
they merely rules of thumb for interpretation, or are they "legal" rules pre-
scribing the form commands must take to have legal effect? When the inter-
preter restricts his interpretation to the words' dictionary meanings, or to
their meanings in English, or says such things as, "Had the Framers intended
the fourteenth amendment to embody no more than the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
they knew how to express such an intent,"' 9 is the interpreter employing an
evidentiary presumption, or is he employing some sort of meta-constitutional
norm, similar to, say, the parol evidence rule? Whatever he is doing, once the
"canons" are recognized as the proper canons, they have a further influence
on interpretation because they indicate to the speaker how his audience can
be expected to interpret him, which in turn influences how the audience
interprets the speaker, which in turn influences the speaker, ad infinitum.20
Fifth, how does the authority relationship between the author of the
command and his audience affect, if at all, interpretation? Does proper inter-
pretation remain a constant as we move from a court's interpretation of a
constitutional provision to a court's interpretation of a statute to a trustee's
interpretation of a trust document, and so on, or is interpretation, at least
when normative provisions are being interpreted, highly sensitive to the
moral/legal aspects of the relationship between the author and the inter-
preter?
Along these lines, I am inclined to suggest that it is a mistake to think of
interpretation as one thing, as a constant in whatever situation it figures. I
believe we will find it much more fruitful to view interpretation as a family of
distinct though related enterprises, with each enterprise representing a dif-
ferent hypothetical question addressed to the author of the command in ques-
tion. Viewing interpretation in this manner will in turn lead us to ask, not what
is the hypothetical question to ask to interpret any command, but rather what
is the hypothetical question to ask to interpret this type of command. The
answer to the latter question will be a moral/political answer in that one's
chosen moral theory will support certain political and legal arrangements,
which will in turn be defined in part by how various instruments--constitu-
tional provisions, statutes, contracts, wills, and so forth-should be inter-
believe the alternative account is incorrect, though I can offer no criteria for distinguishing in brightline
fashion misinterpretation from unreasonable adherence to a correct interpretation.
In the second version, however reasonable on paternalistic grounds is your friend's behavior, it is
not reasonable as an interpretation of your directive.
It may be impossible to improve upon Wittgenstein's classic illustration of the problem:
Someone says to me: "Show the children a game." I teach them gaming with dice, and the other
says, "I didn't mean that sort of game." Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his
mind when he gave me the order?
L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 33e (1953).
19. See ELY, supra note 1, at 30, 198-200; Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1090 (1979).
20. Paul Brest has some interesting things to say about the role of the author's intent with respect to the
canons of interpretation. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
212, 215-16, 220 (1980).
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preted. Thus, one's moral theory may support political/legal principles that
dictate interpreting constitutional provisions in terms of a hypothetical ques-
tion addressed to the Framers that "corrects" totally or to some extent their
empirical and moral "mistakes." On the other hand, one's moral theory may
dictate a more confining principle of statutory interpretation, such as a hypo-
thetical question of the type that basically requires the interpreter to live with,
and the legislature to rectify, the legislature's mistakes. In other words, there
may be in one's moral theory a stronger principle of legislative supremacy
than of Framer supremacy. And when one moves to contracts or wills, where
the autonomy of private individuals enters, perhaps asking a still different
hypothetical question of the party being interpreted is the warranted form of
interpretation."'
Finally, how are all these questions about interpretation affected when
we move from interpreting the command of a single person to interpreting the
command of a collective body? Do we have at bottom any concept of interpre-
tation of collectively authored commands?r'
The modem debate in constitutional theory over "interpretivism" versus
"noninterpretivism," and whether "noninterpretivism" is really "interpreti-
vist" because embodied in certain open-ended constitutional provisions, al-
ready presupposes that we have a relatively clear understanding of what
interpreting a constitution is, when in fact it seems obvious that we do not.
2. Noninterpretivism, Neo-Interpretivism, Quasi-Interpretivism,
and Judicial Review
Much of the modem debate has assumed that courts should overturn the
actions of the democratic institutions of government only when the actions
contravene a constitutional command, properly interpreted. Thus, one can
see the relevance of the discussion in the previous section. Many of the
debate's participants, however, have denied that courts act illegitimately in
invalidating the actions of the other governmental branches on the basis of
norms not discovered through "interpretation." There are three basic posi-
tions among the latter theorists, theorists who adopt "noninterpretivism."
The form of noninterpretivism that is closest to pure interpretivism, a
form that I label "neo-interpretivism," is represented by Ely. The neo-
21. Paul Brest, the only modem theorist to deal with the hypothetical-question approach to interpretation,
ultimately takes a noninterpretivist position with respect to constitutional *'interpretation," and does not reach
any conclusions whatsoever regarding interpretation of other legal instruments. Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). Ronald Dworkin suggests a view of statutory
interpretation that appears to walk a problematic tightrope between hypothetical-question interpretation and
noninterpretivism. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 107-10 (1977); Dworkin, How to Read the Civil
Rights Act, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS. Dec. 20. 1979, at 37.
22. See Brest. The Misconceived Quest fortthe Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204,212-15 (1980);
Dworkin. How to Read the Civil Rights Act, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS. Dec. 20, 1979. at 37. In constitutional
interpretation there is the additional problem of determining which collectivities--the sponsors of provisions,
influential speakers, committees, the convention, the ratifying state legislatures, the state citizens, etc.-should
be deemed most important. Of course, even in interpreting statutes, the same kind of problem is present. For
instance, what effect should the chief executive's intent have on proper interpretation of a statute?
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interpretivist holds that some of the constitutional commands, properly
interpreted, are empty vessels and delegate to the courts the job of supplying
the values required to flesh out the commands. Moreover, the neo-interpre-
tivist holds that the proper source for the requisite values is the Constitution
itself, or rather those values that lie behind and explain the more specific
values that interpretivism reveals. Thus, Ely discovers the value of "broad
participation in the processes and distributions of government" 3 to be the
root value behind many specific constitutional commands and structures, and
he deems this value to be the proper value for fleshing out noninterpretivist
provisions such as the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses
and the ninth amendment. 24 The reason neo-interpretivism is noninterpretivist
is that Ely cannot cite any provision in the Constitution that, in cases where
Ely's conception of "broad participation in the processes... of govern-
ment" conflicts with the democratic institutions' definition of such participa-
tion, justifies favoring Ely's conception.25
The form of noninterpretivism that I label "quasi-interpretivism" is
identical to neo-interpretivism, except that the values necessary to flesh out
the noninterpretive constitutional commands need not be tied closely to
values explicitly recognized in the interpretive provisions. 26 Quasi-interpre-
tivism, like neo-interpretivism, is thus noninterpretivist with respect to sub-
stantive values, but interpretivist with respect to the authority to seek out
noninterpretivist values and with respect to having a particular provision or
provisions in the Constitution on which to hang all holdings of unconstitu-
tionality.27
Pure noninterpretivism is a position that posits judicial authority to in-
validate the actions of democratic institutions based on norms that may be
clearly extraconstitutional. "% For the noninterpretivist there is an unwritten
"constitution" behind the written one, a "constitution" that may contain not
only norms substantively restricting the democratic branches, but also norms
pertaining to judicial review, such as norms governing stare decisis in con-
stitutional cases, norms governing how the written Constitution should be
"interpreted,, 29 norms governing the relation of the written Constitution to
the unwritten one, and norms governing the authority of the democratic
branches to overrule the courts.
23. ELY, supra note I, at 87.
24. ELY, supra note 1, at 73-104. See also Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDentocrac., 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 667-69.
25. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (draft 1980).
26. My neo-interpretivism and quasi-interpretivism are similar to what Paul Brest calls "moderate original-
ism." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204-05 (1980).
27. Laurence Tribe is a good example of one who ties extraconstitutional values to constitutional provi-
sions that he believes function as invitations to apply such values. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1978). See also B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
28. Paul Brest labels pure noninterpretivism "'nonoriginalism." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205 (1980).
29. I place the scare quotes here to flag the issue of whether interpretation properly so-called can be
governed by ethical or legal norms as opposed to ethically or legally-neutral craft norms.
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Michael Perry has recently produced a fairly thorough version of pure
noninterpretivism in which the courts have authority to invalidate actions of
the democratic branches on purely moral grounds not embodied in any con-
stitutional provision, properly interpreted.30 Perry's notion of interpretation is
similar to Berger's, that is, one based on the model of the imagined answer the
Framers would give in the case at hand if they were not made aware of their
factual and ethical errors. Interpretation so defined can account for only a
limited number of the modem individual rights decisions. That does not mean,
however, that for Perry those decisions are unjustified. If the decisions reflect
the society's evolving morality better than do the governmental actions the
decisions overturn, then they are justified. Ultimately, the test of the author-
ity of these noninterpretivist decisions is how Congress responds to them. If
Congress deprives the federal courts ofjurisdiction to consider future cases of
that kind, then the Court will have presumably misgauged society's moral-
ity.3' If the decisions withstand such a Congressional attempt at limitation,
then they are authoritative.32
Perry's version of noninterpretivism is actually a very moderate one. The
interpretivist places the authority of the written Constitution, properly inter-
preted, above the authority of the democratic branches, and the authority of
those branches above that of the courts, except insofar as the courts are
merely interpreting the Constitution. (To be accurate, most interpretivists,
accepting Marbury v. Madison,33 rank the authority of the courts, when they
are attempting in good faith to interpret the Constitution, above the written
Constitution. Indeed, most interpretivists would probably also rank the prin-
ciples of stare decisis34 and necessity occasioned by emergency above the
written Constitution.) Noninterpretivists like Perry also place the authority of
the written Constitution, properly interpreted, and the authority of the courts
acting in the interpretivist mode (as well as principles of stare decisis and
necessity) first.35 But, for Perry, unlike the interpretivists, below this level of
authority is the authority of the courts acting in pursuance of society's evolv-
ing morality, 6 unless checked by the authority of Congress acting to limit the
30. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (draft 1980).
31. See U.S. CONST., art. Ill § 2. cl. 2: "[Tlhe Supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction ... with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall make."
32. See also Perry, Book Review. 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 697-703 (1978).
33. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. See Bennett, -'Mere" Rationali. in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67
CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1092 (1979); Munzer & Nickel. Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1050-62 (1977).
35. There is a potential problem in placing the authority of the written Constitution above that of noninter-
pretivist decisions. Suppose the federal courts and/or Congress come up with a noninterpretivist "constitu-
tional" standard to protect individuals against their state governments. What effect should the tenth amendment
have on the legitimacy of such a standard on the view considered here? See also, Brest, The Misconceived Quest
Jor the Origtinal Understanding. 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 235-36 (1980).
36. There are really two versions of this form of noninterpretivism. In the first, thejudge attempts to divine
society's evolving morality. In the second, the judge attempts to divine true moral principles and hence influ-
ence the direction in which society's morality evolves. In the first, the judge must distinguish his moral views
qua judge from his moral views qua individual. In the second, he need not. Noninterpretivists are often
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jurisdiction of the federal courts. The authority of the democratic banches
acting in their normal mode is subordinate to the authority of the courts acting
in this noninterpretivist mode. The more extreme forms of noninterpretivism
would place judicial authority to implement true moral principles3 7 above the
authority of the Congress, which would have no power constitutionally to
limit the courts' jurisdiction over noninterpretivist cases on grounds it disap-
proved of noninterpretivist decisions. Moreover, the extreme noninterpretiv-
ist might very well place-and indeed would seem logically compelled to
place-the authority of noninterpretive decisions above that of interpretive
ones. 38 (After all, the same reasons for placing the judicial implementation of
true moral principles above the authority of Congress hold for placing the
judicial implementation of such principles above the authority of the inter-
pretivist Constitution.) The extreme forms of noninterpretivism are what
Berger says we presently have.
B. Rules and Principles in the Definition of Constitutional Rights
Assume that we know how properly to interpret constitutional provi-
sions. At this point in the discussion I wish to introduce a philosophical
distinction that bears directly upon constitutional theory, a distinction be-
tween two types of norms. I will label the distinction the "rule/principle"
distinction, but this basic distinction between norm-types could as well be
labelled "formal/informal," "legal/equitable," "mechanical/flexible," or
"opaque/nonopaque." A formal, mechanical, opaque rule is an ideal type of
norm that contrasts with another ideal type, the nonformal, flexible, transpar-
ent principle.39
ambiguous regarding what version they are adopting. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 227 (1980) ("[Tihe practice of constitutional adjudication should enforce
those ... values which are fundamental to our society."); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
115-30, 160-63 (1977). See also Alexander & Bayles, Hercules or Proteus? The Many Theses of Ronald
Dworkin, 5 SOCIAL THEORY & PRACTICE 267, 296-97 n.27 (1980). Other noninterpretivists appear clearly to
opt for the first version. See, e.g., Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1185
(1977) ("constitutional law ... understood as the expression of evolving social norms."); Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Doable Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 244 (1973)
("Judicial reasoning.., must proceed from society's set of moral principles .. ") (One should note the
problem that a noninterpretivist judge will have in phrasing a holding of "unconstitutionality," given that no
provision of the Constitution itself determines the outcome).
37. In the more extreme forms of noninterpretivism, those impervious to democratic overrule of the courts,
it makes little sense for the judge to decide on the basis of society's morality rather than on the basis of what the
judge believes is true morality. See Alexander & Bayles, Hercules or Proteus? The Many Theses of Ronald
Dworkin, 5 SOCIAL THEORY & PRACTICE 267, 296-97 n.27 (1980).
38. Several noninterpretivists adopt the position that the interpretivists' Constitution functions as only the
beginning point in a line of precedent that may evolve into pure noninterpretivism. See Bennett, "'Mere"
Rationality in Constitutional Lan': Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1094 (1979):
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 229, 234 (1980); Munzer&
Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUMI. L. REV. 1029, 1054-57 (1977).
39. My distinction between rules and principles is not identical to Ronald Dworkin's distinction between
the two. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 22-28 (1977). My "'principles" are ultimate moral
standards, though some, like the act-utilitarian principle, would be rules according to Dworkin's analysis. My
"rules" are standards that are intermediate and instrumental to ultimate moral concerns and that are
"opaque"-that is, they preclude consideration of factors that the ultimate moral principles that they are
designed to effectuate would deem relevant. The opacity of rules is morally functional because of the difficulties
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Correct moral principles are the norms that would be applied by an
omniscient, morally motivated decisionmaker. But correct moral principles in
the hands of intellectually and morally fallible human decisionmakers may
produce outcomes that are morally inferior to the outcomes that would be
produced were the decisionmakers guided by rules that are more mechanical
and less fact-sensitive than the correct principles. The reason is that mechani-
cal rules are easier to apply, and others' applications of them are easier to
predict and monitor.40
Arguably, it is theoretically possible, perhaps even common, to have a
case in which the decisionmaker correctly believes he can produce a morally
superior outcome by ignoring the rule and deciding directly under the proper
moral principles, but in which he also believes that the present rule is optimal
and that a publicizable exception to the rule for this kind of case cannot be
carved out without producing morally worse results than the exceptionless
rule produces. In such a case, the decisionmaker is torn between the optimal
rule and the optimal result.4 1
people have in making, predicting, coordinating, and monitoring moral decisions directly under ultimate moral
principles that require consideration of an infinite number of factors. Forexcellent discussions of opacity, see J.
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 21-33 (1979) ("exclusionary reasons"); Powers, Structural Aspects of the
Impact of Lair on Moral Duty Within Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theory, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263
(1979); Powers. Formalism and Nonforntalisin in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27, 28-33
(1976). Dworkin's principles function like those of moral intuitionists. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
34-40 (1971).
40. For discussion of the role of opaque rules in consequentialist moral systems, see D. LYONS, THE
FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 119-460 (1965). See also D. HODGSON, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
UTILITARIANISM 9-37, 63-110, 166-81 (1967); Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the
Theory of Rational Behavior, 12 THEORY AND DECISION 115 (1980); Lyons, Utility as a Possible Ground of
Rights, 14 NOUS 8 (1980); Rails, Rational Morality for Empirical Man, 44 PHIL. 205 (1969); Silverstein,
Utilitarianism and Group Coordination, 13 NOUS 335 (1979). And see Parfit, Is Common-Sense Morality
Self-Defeating?, 76 J. PHIL. 533 (1979). For discussion of opaque rules in legal systems, see J. RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 21-33 (1979); J. REIMAN, IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 24-26, 28, 34 (1972);
R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 118-71 (1961); Bernstein, Legal Utilitarianism, 89 ETHICS 127
(1979); Farrell, Dealing iith Injustice in a Reasonably Just Society: Some Observations on Rawls' Theory of
Political Duty, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 187 (H. Blocker & E. Smith eds. 1980); Gold-
man, The Obligation to Obey Law, 6 SOCIAL THEORY & PRACTICE 13 (1980); Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Laws Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351
(1973); Nonet, The Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 CAL. L. REV. 263 (1980); Powers, Structural
Aspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theory, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1263 (1979); Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV.
27, 28-33 (1976).
41. Rule-consequentialists, such as rule-utilitarians, argue that the optimal rules should be followed in such a
case. The coherence of such a position is questioned by many philosophers. See D. HODGSON, THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM 9-37, 63-110. 166-81 (1967); D. LYONS, THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILI-
TARIANISM 119-60 (1965); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233-49 (1979); J. REIMAN, IN DEFENSE OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 34-38 (1972); R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 51-80
(1975). The more common view is that the decisionmaker should attempt to produce the morally superior
outcome, which may involve deviating from the rule but lying about the deviation in order to preserve the rule.
The common view runs into difficulty because it must endorse an instrumental view of punishment and reward,
of blame and praise, and of publicizing the moral bases of one's actions. Whether it is coherent to "blame"
actions one believes are morally laudable and whether one can "accept- a moral principle that he cannot
publicly endorse (and indeed may have to program himself not to act upon in the name of acting upon that
principle) are very problematic. See, e.g., Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 118-25 (1973); Devine, The Conscious Acceptance of Guilt in the
Necessary Murder. 89 ETHICS 221 (1979); Goldman, Can a Utilitarian's Support of Nonutilitarian Rules
Vindicate Utilitarianism?. 4 SOCIAL THEORY & PRACTICE 333 (1977); Piper, Utility, Publicity, and Manipula-
tion, 88 ETHICS 189 (1978); Rails, Rational Morality for Empirical Maz, 44 PHIL. 205 (1969).
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Now there are three possible ways, relevant to the rule/principle distinc-
tion, that proper interpretation might reveal how a constitutional provision
should be read. First, proper interpretation might reveal that a particular
constitutional provision is a mechanical rule, a rule no doubt believed instru-
mental to some further moral end, but a rule nonetheless. 42
Second, proper interpretation might reveal that a particular constitutional
provision is an ultimate moral principle. The principle might best be realized
through the development of some intermediate, opaque, formal rules, or it
might best be realized through direct, case-by-case application.4 ' But however
it might be best realized, the ultimate principle is the true meaning of the
constitutional provision.
Third, proper interpretation might reveal that certain constitutional pro-
visions operate as alternative lenses on a smaller set of ultimate moral princi-
ples. Thus, there may be a single concept of fairness in the distribution of
property that lies behind the takings clause, the obligations of contract clause,
the due process clause, and the equal protection clause, though the Framers
may have thought that there were several distinct types of fairness, each
corresponding to one of the clauses.44 Again, the single concept of fairness
might best be realized through development of a set of rules, but the rules
would not necessarily correspond in number or content to the several provi-
sions that invoke the ultimate concept.
C. The Relation Among Judicial Review, Interpretation, and the
Rule/Principle Distinction
Those for whom democratic values rank quite high may, of course, reject
Marbury v. Madison or even constitutionalism. But they may take the less
extreme position that the Constitution, as the embodiment of the commands
of the Framers, is supreme over democratic institutions, but only to the extent
that it contains clear rules and not vague principles. Clear rules can be trusted
to nondemocratic institutions because their application can be easily moni-
tored by the people. Of course, the clear rules may be both morally obnoxious
and yet for some reason impossible to amend under the rules governing
42. The reasoning behind such a rule might have gone as follows:
We. the Framers, know that certain reasons-for example, subjugating blacks-will almost never
be necessary intermediate reasons to the permissible or required ultimate governmental reasons for
action. If we absolutely proscribe such reasons, we will impose the cost of obstructing on rare occasion
some otherwise necessary or permissible government action. On the other hand, if we were to pro-
scribe such reasons only when they were inconsistent with the required or permissible ultimate ones.
government would act on such reasons more frequently than warranted, urging in good faith or in bad
faith that its ultimate reasons were proper, and the courts would frequently fail to detect the violations.
The costs of this option would be greater than the costs of the absolute proscription.
43. For discussion of the judicial decision whether to implement ultimate constitutional principles directly
or through intermediate, mechanical rules, see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONNIAK-
ING 994-1003 (1975). See also Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law. 89 HARV. L. REV. I. 30.
33-34 (1975).
44. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463 (1978).
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amendments, in which case a crisis portending a constitutional revolution is at
hand. Nevertheless, a set of reasonably acceptable and clear rules applied by
courts to check democratic institutions may be thought superior to democracy
without such constitutional restraints.45
On the other hand, if the Constitution embodies, not rules, but moral
principles, then those who esteem democracy might totally deny the authority
of the Constitution and of judicial review in pursuance of constitutional
norms. Their argument would be that if the Framers' moral principles are
erroneous, democratic institutions are checked without either the virtue of
substantive moral warrant or the virtue of clear and predictable rules. All of
the Constitution's authority must therefore rest on the inadequate personal
authority of the Framers. In short, if the Constitution embodies incorrect
moral principles, judicial noninterpretivism is preferable to judicial interpre-
tivism. If, on the other hand, the Constitution embodies correct moral princi-
ples, then, while judicial checking of democratic institutions is not in pursu-
ance of incorrect moral principles, it still lacks the virtue of action in pursu-
ance of clear and predictable rules. In short, if the Constitution embodies
correct moral principles, judicial interpretivism adds nothing to judicial non-
interpretivism. And a democrat may cogently reject judicial noninterpreti-
vism, that is, judicial authority to check the democratic branches based solely
on the judiciary's particular conception of correct moral principles.
From the above analysis it is easy to see why constitutional theories
should gravitate toward interpreting constitutional provisions as clear,
mechanical rulese or toward "interpreting"them as correct moral principles.
Moreover, the latter type of "interpretation" leads inevitably towards non-
interpretivism of the Perry variety-the written, interpretivist Constitution,
or the interpretivist clauses of the Constitution (the "rules"), alongside the
noninterpretivist moral principles (perhaps traceable to particular clauses). 47
In Perry's scheme, the written, interpretivist Constitution is supreme over
noninterpretivist standards. The logic of noninterpretivism, however, inevi-
tably erodes the authority of conflicting constitutional rules, so that ultimately
45. Even if there were no judicial review of legislation, an interpretivist legislator would still consider the
meaning of constitutional provisions to be important in fulfilling his or her obligations. See Alexander. Book
Review. 29 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1305-06 (1977); Brest, The Conscientiois Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
46. As Justice Black interpreted the first amendment. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
140-44 (1959) (Black. J.. dissenting).
47. The Constitution is commonly read as containing two types of provisions: narrow, rule-like, interpre-
tivist provisions, and broad, nonformal, neo or quasi-interpretivist ones. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CON-
STITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 114-18 (1975).
Logically. tracing an ultimate moral principle to some clause in the Constitution, properly interpreted, adds
nothing to the principle's authority. Others have noted how the authority of the Framers' specific conceptions is
eroded when a provision is interpreted as a principle rather than as a rule. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204. 231-32 (1980); Greenawalt, Comments to Chapters
2 and 3. in THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 86, 89-90 (L. Theberge ed. 1979). Cf. B. GABIN,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT TEST (1980)(the proper role of the courts is to overtum
only that legislation that is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt-a conception of judicial review that
would virtually restrict it to constitutional rules, not principles).
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all theories gravitate toward rule-oriented interpretivist theories for those,
like Berger or Justice Black, who prefer democratic institutions to courts, or
toward pure judicial supremacy under correct moral principles, perhaps with
a check through amendment or curtailment of jurisdiction. 48 Theories that
attempt a middle course, that treat constitutional provisions as principles,
not as mechanical rules, but not necessarily the best principles, ultimately
founder in their attempt to justify the authority of the Constitution. 49
III. THEORIES OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
I now wish to shift the focus from constitutional interpretation and the
judicial role in general to the equal protection clause in particular. I shall not
dwell on the clause's legislative history, a subject well canvassed elsewhere. 50
Instead, I shall describe the various types of modern theories of equal protec-
tion and point out the problems each encounters, the relation of equal protec-
tion under each theory to the rest of the Constitution, and the roles of the
judiciary and the nonjudicial branches that seem most appropriate for each
theory.
A. The Distinction Between Nonoptional and Optional Governmental Action
To begin to understand modern theories of equal protection, one must
distinguish between those laws and other governmental acts5' that are either
mandated or forbidden by the Constitution-what I shall call "nonoptional
rules'--and those laws and other governmental acts that are neither man-
dated nor forbidden by the Constitution-what I shall call "optional rules." A
constitutional theorist may decide, for example, that the government has a
constitutional obligation to hold elections every four years and a constitu-
tional obligation not to allow public officials to recover damages for defama-
tion in the absence of malice. The theorist may also decide that the govern-
ment is constitutionally permitted, but not constitutionally obligated, to pro-
vide welfare for the poor, or to require proof beyond the "clear and convinc-
ing" level to commit the insane.
What is crucial to recognize is that deeming a governmental rule
"optional" is not to deny that the benefit or burden it allocates is subject to
48. The latter course appears to be the one chosen by Brest and Perry. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION.
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (draft 1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understand-
ing, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
49. I have elsewhere criticized Ronald Dworkin's legal theory on the ground that he requires judges to
employ standards that are neither clear and mechanical nor morally preferable. Alexander & Bayles, Hercules or
Proteus? The Many Theses ofRonaldDworkin, 5 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 267, 271-78 (1980). See also
Bayles, Morality and the Constitution, 1978 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 561, 565-66; Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,231-32 (1980); Ladenson, Freedom ofthe Press:A Jurisprudential
Inquiry, 6 SOCIAL THEORY & PRACTICE 163, 166-67 (1980). But see Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie
After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 336 (1980).
50. See, e.g., R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Cri-
tique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 651 (1979).
51. Hereafter I shall refer to all governmental decisions-whether they be statutes, published or unpub-
lished administrative rules, or ad hoc decisions by administrators or courts-as -'rules."
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constitutional restrictions. Indeed, all the modem theorists-and perhaps
more importantly, the Supreme Court-maintain that most if not all of the
concern of equal protection, and much of the concern of the speech and
religion clauses (and their fourteenth amendment umbrella, due process),
procedural due process, the interstate privileges and immunities clause, the
dormant commerce clause, and perhaps even the takings clause and the bill of
attainder clause, lies in the area of optional government rules.
Just how can a benefit or burden be constitutionally optional in one sense
and yet a rule allocating it be constitutionally forbidden? How, for example,
can one sensibly maintain that as a constitutional matter the government need
not give welfare to anyone, but that it is constitutionally forbidden to give
more welfare to needy whites than to equally needy blacks?
Most of the knottiest problems in modem constitutional law implicate
this general question. Why may government forbid all speech delivered at a
certain time or a certain place or in a certain manner, but may not forbid only
some speech and permit all other speech so delivered? 2 Why may govern-
ment completely eliminate a public employment position, but may not condi-
tion such employment on the absence of procedural protection,53 on political
affiliation,5 4 or on citizenship?5 5 Does government violate the Constitution
when it provides health benefits, which it need not provide anyone, to enable
women to choose childbirth-a choice that government must permit-but
refuses to provide health benefits to enable women to choose abortion-equal-
52. Compare Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972); and Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville,422 U.S. 205 (1975); with Lehman v. City ofShaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974); Young v. American Mini Theatres. Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); and Greer v. Spock. 424 U.S. 828
(1976). See generally L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 672-74,681-82,692-93; Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Stone, Restrictions of Speech
Because of lts Content: The Peculiar Case ofSubject-MatterRestrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). Favoring
the **press'" over the public, or certain members of the press over other members, when access to a public event or
information must be restricted, implicates the same general issue.
53. Compare Perry v. Sinderman. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). with Bishop v. Wood. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
54, See Elrod v. Bums. 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
In the Branti case. Justice Powell, in dissent, raised the interesting point that had the public employee (a
deputy public defender) been an elected rather than an appointed official, his political affiliation could constitu-
tionally have been considered by the electorate. Id. at 1302. There are three possible positions on this point.
First. Justice Powell may be correct, in which case to justify Branti one must come up with a theory that
explains why the electorate may consider a candidate's party affiliation and perhaps her race, gender, and
religion, but an administrator, herself an elected official. may not consider those factors in making an appoint-
ment. Second. Justice Powell may be incorrect, and the electorate may be constitutionally forbidden to consider
political affiliation in selecting nonpolicymaking employees, but the courts have no power to inquire into the
electorate's selection criteria. Precedent appears to suggest, however, that courts may look at voter motivation
to invalidate election results. See. e.g.. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969). Third. Justice Powell may be incorrect, and were the courts to discover that a nonpolicymaking
official was not elected because of her political affiliation, they would invalidate the election. This seems like an
extreme position, inconsistent with our well-settled belief that political affiliation is a proper factor to consider in
voting; but it would explain the Court's previous extreme position of, in effect, outlawing racial political parties.
See Terry v. Adams. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
55. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). The theory presently in vogue for analyzing state discriminations against aliens; is
federal preemption, not equal protection. See Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens; Preemption of Equal
Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979).
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ly a choice that government must permit? 56 Does government violate the Con-
stitution by favoring certain lifestyles through awards of constitutionally op-
tional benefits when it cannot constitutionally proscribe the lifestyles not so
favored? 57 Does government violate the Constitution when it allows a criminal
defendant to plead a constitutionally optional defense but does not require the
government to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt?5 8 And if government
must provide equal public education, even if it is constitutionally permitted to
provide no public education, does equal mean equal inputs of dollars, without
regard to language handicaps, physical handicaps, psychological handicaps,
or the general educational handicaps of a poor genetic endowment or educa-
tional environment, or does equal mean equal educational achievement (equal
outputs)? Any constitutional theorist who purports to remain faithful to con-
stitutional practice must explain this particular phenomenon of a govern-
mental benefit's (or burden's) being constitutionally optional and yet not al-
locable on the basis of just any reason the government prefers. Any theory
that rejects the idea of constitutionally optional governmental benefits, or that
accepts the idea of such benefits but rejects constitutional limitations on
them, will be strongly revisionist.
B. Equal Protection Methodology
In the following pages I am going to examine the methodology that is
logically implied by two views of equal protection: the view that equal pro-
tection is primarily concerned with nonoptional governmental benefits and
burdens, and the view that equal protection is primarily concerned with
optional governmental benefits and burdens. In so doing I hope to clarify to
some extent the proper roles in equal protection methodology of govern-
mental motives, effects, fundamental interests, suspect classifications,
means/ends fit, less restrictive alternatives, and the legitimacy and compel-
lingness of governmental interests. I also hope to show why the equal protec-
tion assessment of governmental allocations of optional benefits and burdens
tends inevitably to get entangled with, and perhaps ultimately to collapse into,
due process assessments of nonoptional allocations of those benefits and
burdens.
1. With Respect to Nonoptional Benefits (and Burdens)
If we are dealing with a governmental rule that is constitutionally man-
dated or forbidden-that is, a rule that is not constitutionally optional-then
56. See Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2701 (1980). On the question of
whether welfare is a constitutionally optional benefit, see L. TRIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
918-20 (1978); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618. 633 (1%9).
57. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), with U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno.
413 U.S. 528 (1973). Consider in this regard ideological speech by the government and governmental endorse-
ment of certain values in the curriculum of public schools. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
588-91 (1978); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV.
1104 (1979); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565 (1980); Yudof, When Governments Speak:
Toward a Theory of Governtnent Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863 (1979); Note. The
Constitntionality of Municipal Advocacy in State-Wide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1930):
Note, Unconstitutional Government Speech, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 815 (1978).
58. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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we will be totally unconcerned with the government's reasons for not acting
(if action is mandated) or acting (if action is forbidden). Results, not inten-
tions, will be all that matter.59
Moreover, if the Constitution mandates one complete set of govern-
mental rules and leaves no room for choice, the equal protection portion of
the Constitution would be distinguishable from, say, the substantive due
process portion in the latter's speech, religion, and autonomy modes only
with respect to the types of rules mandated by each portion. For instance, due
process might protect the right to choose an abortion; equal protection might
protect the right to minimum income, health care, education, and housing as
well as the right to equal apportionment in the constitutionally mandated
elections. (By hypothesis, elections would be either mandated or forbidden.)
Every possible rule that government might enact would be either mandated or
forbidden under some portion of the Constitution. Let us call such a view of
the Constitution and equal protection the nonoptional view. It is represented
by Diagram A:
Diagram A
x
universe
of possible Y
governmental
rules
m :set of rules required by the moral theory underlying the
Constitution
X range of cases Framers had in mind when promulgated,
say. the equal protection clause
Y range of cases Framers had in mind when promulgated,
say, the takings clause
Z range of cases Framers had in mind when promulgated,
say, the first amendment speech clause
59. When I say that reasons are irrelevant in the area of constitutionally nonoptional rules. I do not mean to
suggest that the nonoptionality of such rules renders their performance or nonperformance mandatory regard-
less of circumstances. A particular rule might be constitutionally required in circumstances C and constitu-
tionally forbidden in all other circumstances. In that sense the rule's constitutionality is dependent upon
"reasons" in an objective sense, but the government's actual reasons are completely irrelevant.
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The first thing to note about the nonoptional view of equal protection is
how foreign it seems to modem equal protection jurisprudence. In a true equal
protection case it is thought that the government may extend the benefit or
burden either to no one or to everyone, but that equal protection problems
arise when government extends the benefit or burden to some but not all. In
other words, a governmental option is assumed.
One could, of course, explain the appearance of optionality in equal
protection jurisprudence by notions of institutional deference-that is, that
the courts are often institutionally ill-equipped to assess the constitutionality
of a rule, and that it represents a sounder division of labor for the courts to
defer to the constitutional judgments of other branches in these cases. 60 On
such an explanation, the legislature itself has no true moral options left open
by the Constitution. (Another, very similar explanation for the appearance of
a constitutional optionality, one adopted by Richards6' and Michelman62 to
suggest how the Constitution might embody John Rawls' 63 philosophy with-
out requiring courts to invalidate all non-Rawlsian governmental rules, is that
while the Constitution embodies one moral theory, the courts need only en-
force one part of that theory. The other governmental departments must be
looked to for enforcement of the theory in its entirety.) We can represent the
explanation by Diagram B.
The second thing to note about the nonoptional view of equal protection
is the curious role of the democratic legislature. If the Constitution is a com-
plete blueprint of nonoptional governmental rules, then legislatures-the
democratic branches-have no true choices to make. At best, some final
constitutional authority, or some broad judgmental discretion with respect to
certain matters, might be vested in the legislatures rather than the courts; but
democracy would then fit into the constitutional scheme as a procedure for
certain kinds of constitutional interpretation rather than as a procedure for
making true substantive choices about the direction of public policy.
64
60. See Alexander, Initroduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925. 930. 934
(1978); O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19.
43 (1979); Perry, Constitutional "Fairness": Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 VA. L. REV. 383,
398--99 n.71 (1977).
61. D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 144-57 (1977).
62. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659. 684-85. See
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 962 (1973); Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Anendnent, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 918-21 (1978).
63. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
64. Moral theory tends to leave no room for politics. See Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 209, 228 (1980). Although we recognize the value of allowing individuals areas of unfettered, free
choice, we do not recognize the value of allowing governments or governmental officials such areas. Areas that
may appear to contradict this, like voting for deputy public defenders as opposed to appointing them (see note 54
supra), pardoning a criminal, or appointing a cabinet, are best explained, not as areas of plenary discretion. in
which no legal standards govern the decisions, but as areas in which final legal authority does not rest in the courts,
or areas in which the courts grant considerable deference to other institutions' judgments. In some cases it is
difficult to determine whether an area is one ofgovernmental free choice or is instead an area ofprivate free choice
that is given legal effect. See, e.g., Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Washington ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). See also Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and
Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975).
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Diagram B
universe of oe!
possible
governmental
rules /
"..,7"',A",I
~ rules forbidden by the Constitution and by the courts
rules forbidden by the Constitution and allowed by the courts,
or required by the Constitution but not by the courts-the area
of judicial deference
:rules required by the Constitution and the courts
As we shall see, despite the foreign implications of the nonoptional view
of equal protection, there is an inevitable tendency toward it born of the
theoretical difficulties inherent in the orthodox opposing view of equal pro-
tection as concerned with optional governmental rules.
2. With Respect to Optional Benefits (and Burdens)
a. The Role of Governmental Reasons: Finding the Real Rule that
Government Is Following
Assume that government has a constitutional option whether to provide
public swimming pools. Assume further that a rule that allowed only whites to
swim in public swimming pools would violate equal protection. (I shall dis-
cuss below why the latter rule would violate equal protection, even though
public swimming pools need not be provided at all.) 65 Finally, assume that
government is constitutionally permitted to change its mind and revoke an
65. See text accompanying notes 103-13 infra.
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optional benefit or burden that it previously granted or imposed.6 Thus,
government could decide at one time to provide public swimming pools and at
another to close them.
If we make these three assumptions, then it becomes possible to see why
one will be concerned with government's reasons for opening or closing the
public swimming pools. If its reason for either rule were to allow whites but
not blacks to swim, a reason that it cannot expressly embody in a rule, we
might predict a rule of "no public pools" when blacks would be the primary
beneficiaries of such pools, and a rule of "public pools" when whites would
be the primary beneficiaries. The effects of such changes back and forth
between two optional rules would be virtually indistinguishable from the
once-and-for-all enactment of the constitutionally forbidden rule, "public
pools open only when whites will primarily benefit." 67
The reason behind the rule-the government's motive-is thus relevant
in the area of optional benefits and burdens because, in the absence of a
principle requiring government to stick with an option once chosen, govern-
ment's reason constitutes the meta-rule, the real rule behind the ostensible
rule. (In the area of ad hoc, optional administrative decisions, such as deci-
sions regarding hiring, when there are no published rules, and when a particu-
lar decision is consistent with application of both optional and forbidden
rules, the equivalence of the true rule with the government's reason for its
decision is quite easily seen. But ad hoc administrative decisionmaking is just
a special case where the true rule cannot be camouflaged with a published rule
that has a different content but produces the same result in the particular
circumstances. It is not different in kind from governmental action through
published rules. 68)
This dependence on finding government's reasons for its ostensibly
optional rules renders equal protection analysis with respect to optional bene-
fits (and burdens) vulnerable on three grounds. First, there is the huge
epistemic problem of discovering just what are government's reasons for its
optional rules. Second, there is the conceptual problem of assigning
66. In other words, there is no "freezing principle" at work here that locks government into whichever
optional course it first decides upon. If government were locked in, then once it made a choice to allocate or not
to allocate an optional benefit or burden, the benefit or burden would no longer be optional. A moment's
reflection will tell one that government would have to stick with those allocations that it chose (and that were
constitutionally permitted) immediately after the effective date of the constitutional provision in question.
Although the generally accepted position is that government is not usually "frozen" into its original
allocation of optional benefits and burdens, there are limited freezing principles in the Constitution that do apply
to some governmental shifts in such allocations. Takings of property, impairments of contracts, and severe
upsets of vested rights can all be viewed as part of a principle that "freezes" government into certain alloca-
tions, at least to the extent of preventing drastic swings between opposite optional positions. In terms that will
be developed below, such drastic swings fall into an area condemned by all optional moral theories. See Diagram
C and text accompanying notes 103-13 itfra.
67. See Alexander. Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionalitv. 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 928-29
(1978).
68. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95. See also Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
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"reasons" to multimembered governmental entities such as legislatures. 69 I
will not deal with either of those problems in this Article. 70 The third problem
is that of identifying the step in government's chain of reasons for its rule that
constitutes the reason for which we are looking. Government may close the
public pools in order to disadvantage blacks in order (ultimately) to promote
the general welfare. Is promotion of the general welfare or disadvantaging
blacks the relevant reason for equal protection purposes, and why? More on
this below. 71
b. Evaluation of Government's True Rule
After we have identified government's reason for its rule and thus its true
rule, the next step in equal protection methodology with respect to optional
benefits and burdens is to ask, is the true rule proper or improper? This
question is obviously the central question of equal protection. Moreover, it is
central even without judicial review; primary governmental decisionmakers-
legislators and administrators-have a duty to act constitutionally, and they
must, therefore, assess the propriety of their own rules allocating optional
benefits and burdens in particular ways.72
Basically, there are two main types of equal protection theories regarding
proper and improper governmental rules for allocating optional benefits and
burdens. I shall call the two types substantive theories and process theories.
Substantive theories evaluate rules according to principles that dictate how
government may affect individuals. Substantive theories thus evaluate gov-
ernmental rules according to the rules' effects.73 Process theories on the other
hand evaluate rules according to a model of a properly functioning legislative
process. Process theorists thus focus on the relation between governmental
reasons for the rules and procedural regularity. I shall examine both types of
theories and shall attempt to show why process theories ultimately rest on
substantive ones or else are unsatisfactory.
69. Related to this problem is the problem of how the conscientious legislator should vote when he knows
his colleagues have unconstitutional motives for supporting a rule but he himself has proper motives for
supporting it. See Alexander, Motivation and Constitutionality: A Postscript, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 885,
886-87 (1979).
70. The first problem is dealt with quite extensively by Larry Simon. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Govern-
mental Actions: A Motication Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1041, 1065-1130 (1978). See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Decv. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977). The second problem receives some attention in Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and
Constitutionalit.y. 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 937-38 (1978); Alexander, Motivation and Constitutionality: A
Postscript. 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 885. 885-86 (1979); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing. 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212-213 (1980): Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motiva-
lion Theory ofthe Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1097-1107
(1978).
71. See text accompanying notes 99-102 infra.
72. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 SrAN. L. REV.
585 (1975). Too much attention in the constitutional law literature has been focused on principles of judicial
review of other governmental bodies rather than on substantive constitutional principles themselves. See
Alexander, Book Review, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1299. 1305-07 (1977); Richards, Hmian Rights and the Moral
Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395, 1446 (1979).
73. In looking at a rule's effects, we are really looking at the effects of the entire set of rules. See
Alexander, Introduction: Motiration and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 927 n. 14 (1978).
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(1) Substantive Theories for Evaluating Governmental Rules
(a) Ultimate Moral Principles
Suppose that equal protection embodies an ultimate moral principle or
set of principles that require government to maximize the position of the least
advantaged, 74 to maximize total utility,75 or to protect natural rights and pro-
vide fair shares of resources.76 The only proper governmental rules therefore
would be the rules required by the mandated moral principles.
Of course, for equal protection to embody a command that government
act to comply with a comprehensive moral position, such as Rawls' or
Nozick's, and yet still leave room for governmental options, equal protection
must embody alternative moral positions-for example, both Rawls' and
Nozick's. 77 If the only proper rule for allocating an optional benefit or burden
in a particular way is, say, the (Rawlsian) rule that maximizes the position of
the least advantaged, then there would be nothing optional about the alloca-
tion. The decisions to award welfare to all the poor, to some of the poor, or to
none of the poor would all be assessed according to which rule in fact com-
plies with Rawls' dictates. One of the rules would be constitutionally re-
quired.78 Put differently, just as the nonoptional view of equal protection must
explain why judicial doctrines create the appearance of governmental options
and must explain why democracy is important in the absence of substantive
choice, the optional view of equal protection must explain why the moral
standards employed to assess the propriety of unequal allocations of optional
benefits do not also function as standards to assess the propriety of treating
the benefits as optional in the first place.
Thus, equal protection must contain alternative permissible moral posi-
tions as the standards for proper and improper rules if it contains any ultimate
moral position at all and yet also treats certain benefits and burdens as option-
al. Optionality is produced when, for example, either Rawls or Nozick (or
74. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75, 302 (1971).
75. See J. BENTHAM. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789).
76. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
77. For an embarrassingly simplistic attempt to equate the governing principles of the Warren Court with
Rawls', and the governing principles of the Burger Court with Nozick's, an attempt based on an extremely
strained reading of the work of both the Court and the philosophers, see Nowak, Foreword: Ecaluating the
Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263 (1980).
Actually, when one analyzes properly the implications of Nozick's "Lockean proviso" (R. NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 174-82 (1974)) for the distribution of shares in material resources and rights to
engage in potentially conflicting activities, the difference between Rawlsian and Nozickian distributions is not
nearly so great as most imagine. I discuss this fully in my forthcoming book, MODERN LIBERTARIAN THEORY:
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM. On the other hand, Rawlsian and Nozickian distributions will not be virtually
identical, despite a minority opinion to that effect. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributire Justice, 89
YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
78. One might respond that a moral theory could itself carve out spaces for choices not themselves
governed by the principles of the theory. Such a moral theory is indeed plausible if we are dealing with choices
of individuals. Thus, even a utilitarian might take the rule-utilitarian tack of saying that utility would be
maximized if individuals had areas of freedom not subject to the duty to maximize utility. But governments do
not possess the attributes of natural persons that make carving out an area of freedom within a moral theory for
natural persons plausible for government itself.
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Bentham) can render a governmental rule proper. Only if equal protection
embodies more than one, but not an infinite number of, moral standards will
Justice Holmes' position in his Lochner dissent79-that the Constitution has
room for more than one ultimate moral position-be vindicated without at the
same time depriving us of any standard whatsoever for assessing governmental
rules. Yet, as I shall demonstrate below, optionality purchased at the price of
allowing government to choose between or among ultimate moral positions
leads to some rather formidable theoretical difficulties.80
(b) Specific Impermissible Effects
Equal protection could be thought of as embodying a command not to
produce certain specific effects, which effects are described at a level less
abstract than the effects described in an ultimate moral theory. Thus, instead
of commanding that government act to maximize utility or the position of the
least advantaged, equal protection might command only that government not
act to worsen the position of, say, blacks as a group.81
Such a limited substantive standard for evaluating governmental rules is,
by hypothesis, not an ultimate moral standard. Therefore, unless the limited
standard is a formal rule in that set of formal rules that best implements an
ultimate, nonformal moral principle, the limited standard will not be an
optimal standard. Equal protection as the embodiment of a limited substan-
tive standard proscribing specific effects is therefore difficult to defend, ex-
cept as an optimal intermediate rule.
Moreover, even if equal protection were one formal rule in that set of
formal rules that best implements an ultimate moral standard, it is difficult to
understand why the whole set of such formal rules is not then contained in the
Constitution. In other words, why would the Framers grant the government
the legal option to engage in some but not all immoral behavior? (Even if equal
protection embodied an ultimate moral principle, but a principle that was
limited in that it was only one of a set of such ultimate principles within a
given moral theory, the same question could be asked.) On the other hand, if
the whole set of formal and nonformal standards required by a moral theory
are contained in the Constitution, although only one or some are contained in
the equal protection clause, we are back to the nonoptional view of constitu-
tionality in general and equal protection in particular. Finally, unless it is
possible for more than one set of governmental rules to be consistent with the
limited substantive standard that equal protection is supposed to embody, the
standard will destroy optionality without even the virtue of being an ultimate
moral standard.
Fiss' theory of equal protection employs a limited substantive standard
for assessing governmental reasons that falls prey to these difficulties.82 Fiss
79. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45. 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. See text accompanying notes 99-113 infra.
81. See, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
82. Id.
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describes a violation of equal protection as any governmental action that
exacerbates the position of groups such as blacks. With a proper theory of
state action,83 Fiss' standard leads to an equal protection mandate of group
equality. Yet that standard lacks any warrant in terms of an acceptable ulti-
mate moral position 4 or in terms of being a formal rule that best implements
an acceptable moral position. And the standard surely leaves little or no room
for true governmental choice, since almost every governmental .act affects
the relative social positions of blacks and whites. Moreover, Fiss' standard
has been consistently rejected by the Supreme Court.85
Berger's position on the meaning of equal protection-that equal protec-
tion is basically synonymous with the 1866 Civil Rights Act-is another
example of a limited substantive standard. Equal protection would amount to
a very specific moral rule, which might or might not have a rule-consequenti-
alist justification in terms of a more general moral position. Clearly, Berger's
position, unlike Fiss', does leave room for governmental options. Any rule
that does not allocate a benefit or burden on the basis of race will fall outside
the scope of Berger's version of equal protection. Indeed, rules that allocate
benefits and burdens on a "separate-but-equal" basis may do so as well. On
the other hand, Berger's position, like Fiss', may not represent an optimal
formal rule. If the rule outlawed all affirmative action, for example, its costs in
terms of an ultimate moral position to which it is ultimately related might
exceed the benefits that flow from its rigid, mechanical application. 7 If the
rule made exceptions for instances like affirmative action, it would probably
cease to retain its formal quality, the quality that would make it superior to an
ultimate moral principle. Finally, the Supreme Court has in a vast number of
cases rejected Berger's version of equal protection.88
(c) The Role of the Decisionmaker's Factual Mistakes in
(Optional) Equal Protection Methodology
In the previous section the focus was on the substantive position-
ultimate moral principles or specific impermissible effects-in terms of which
83. See Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975).
84. The predominant moral concepts in our culture are at bottom individualistic rather than group-
centered. See Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-52
(1976). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 993 n.18 (1978).
85. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden. 445 U.S. 55 (1980); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
86. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 191-92 (1977). Berger's position on equal protection has
been widely attacked. See, e.g., Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Reviews" and
Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1090-91, 1094 (1979); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of
Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 651 (1979). It has also been widely supported. See, e.g., Perry,
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1026-28 (1979).
87. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick. 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979); Dworkin. How to Read the Civil Rights Act, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 20, 1979, at 37.
88. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 991-1136 (1978); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1023, 1026-32. 1050-51 (1979).
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government's true rules were to be evaluated. As I tried to stress, for gov-
ernment to retain constitutional options in its allocations of benefits and
burdens, it must be permitted to choose among more than one set of ultimate
moral principles. If government must as a constitutional matter follow Rawls
and not Nozick, or vice versa, then it will not have any true options. If
government is constitutionally permitted to follow either Rawls or Nozick,
however, then not only shall we be concerned, as the discussion of meta-rules
makes clear, 9 with whether governmental officials are in a subjective sense
attempting to follow a permissible moral theory; we shall also be concerned
with whether they are objectively succeeding in following that theory. We
shall be concerned, that is, with governmental "mistakes."
At the outset I need to comment on a tradition in equal protection theory
that is as strong as it is wrongheaded. That tradition regards a means/ends
mistake by the governmental decisionmaker as the sine qua non of unconsti-
tutionality under the equal protection clause. According to this tradition, it is
not the legitimacy of government's ends as determined under an ultimate
moral position that renders government's rules constitutional or unconstitu-
tional. Nor is it the effects of government's rules. Rather, it is the mismatch of
those effects with those ends.
This tradition of equating equal protection with instrumental rationality-
what I call the mistake theory of equal protection-is directly traceable to the
seminal article by Tussman and tenBroek,90 although it is probably born of the
general post-Lochner desire to develop a value-free constitutional juris-
prudence. 9' Despite devastating attacks,9" the mistake theory continues to
thrive, bolstered by Gerald Gunther's Harvard Foreword 93 and by thousands
of pages of judicial opinions and law review articles that seem totally con-
cerned with means/ends fit.
The idea that government is free under the equal protection clause to
pursue any end whatsoever-even oppression of blacks-so long as its means
are well-fitted to that end, is incredible on its face.94 But governmental mis-
89. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
90. Tussman & tenBroek. The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
91. See Alexander. Book Review. 29 STAN. L. REV. 1299. 1305-07 (1977).
92. See Baker, Neutrality, Process. and Rationality as Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal Protection,
58 TEX. L. REV. 1029 (1980); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976); Shaman, The Rule oJ Reasonableness in Constitutional Adjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible
Judicial Review and the Establishment of a Viable Theory of the Equal Protection Clause. 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 153, 166-71 (1975); Tribe. Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1. 5-6 (1973). Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123
(1972). See also Alexander. Book Review. 29 STAN. L. REV. 1299. 1305-07 (1977); Alexander, Motivation and
Constitutionality: A Postscript. 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 885, 887-89 (1979); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049. 1058-59 (1978). But see Bice. Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1. 56
(1980).
93. Gunther. Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
94. See Alexander. Motivation and Constitutionality: A Postscript, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 885, 887-89
(1979).
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takes do play an important role in equal protection methodology if equal
protection deals with benefits and burdens that are optional, although the role
that mistakes play is subordinate to the role of evaluating ultimate govern-
mental ends in terms of whether those ends are permitted or forbidden. I shall
attempt to describe the proper role of mistakes in (optional) equal protection
methodology by focusing on four paradigm situations: (1) when government
has an improper meta-rule but has a rule whose effects are inconsistent with
the improper meta-rule and consistent with another, proper meta-rule (bad
meta-rule, good rule); (2) when government has a proper meta-rule but has a
rule whose effects are inconsistent with the meta-rule and consistent only
with an improper meta-rule (good meta-rule, bad rule); (3) when government
has a proper meta-rule but has a rule whose effects are inconsistent with the
meta-rule and consistent with another proper meta-rule (good, meta-rule,
good 2 rule); and (4) when government has a good meta-rule and has a rule
consistent with that meta-rule but has misperceived the relation between the
rule and the meta-rule (good meta-rule, good rule, mistaken connection).
(i) Bad Meta-Rule, Good Rule
Let us from here on represent "government" by the top official in a city
who has general legislative authority. Let us call him Gordon.95 And let us
represent the affected citizens through two people, Betty and Wilbur.
Suppose that Gordon is permitted by equal protection to follow Rawls or
to follow Nozick but is not permitted to follow Bentham. Suppose that Rawls
would require the building of a public swimming pool-the pool would maxi-
mize the position of Betty, the least advantaged; Nozick would forbid the
building of public pools-the taxes on Wilbur would represent forced labor;
and Bentham would, like Rawls, require the building of public pools-the
utility gains to Betty and Wilbur in terms of swimming and in terms of Betty's
feminist external preferences outweigh Betty's and Wilbur's utility losses in
terms of taxes and in terms of Wilbur's misogynistic external preferences.
Suppose that Gordon wants to follow Bentham but mistakenly foregoes build-
ing the pool, the Nozick-required decision. 96 Should his "mistake" save his
decision from invalidation? The situation is illustrated by Diagram C.
I have already said that following correctly an improper meta-rule (say,
Bentham) produces a string of invalid decisions including the decision at the
point (p') where that string intersects with a string of decisions under a proper
meta-rule (say, Rawls). 97 Thus, were Gordon to build a pool, a decision con-
sistent with both Rawls and Bentham, his action should be invalidated. If I
95. 1 am purposely using a masculine name because some of my examples will involve anti-feminine
sexism.
96. "Inactions" are as subject to equal protection review as -actions" given a proper view of state action.
See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionalit.v, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 936-37 (1978):
Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893
(1975).
97. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
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Diagram C
rules required by Rawls and forbidden by Nozick
E:
rules required by Nozick and forbidden by Rawls
area where Rawls and Nozick require the same rules
(below point X): area where Rawls and Nozick forbid the
same rules
point below which Rawls and Nozick require and forbid
the same rules and hence give government no options re-
garding the allocation of benefits and burdens; point above
which government may allocate benefits and burdens
either according to Rawls or according to Nozick. Point X
separates area of equal protection (optionals, "privi-
leges")-above point X-from area of due process (non-
optionals, "rights")-below point X.
\: rules required by forbidden Benthamite meta-rule
D actual rule (decision) not to build public swimming pool
(required by Nozick, forbidden by Rawls)
D' rule (decision) to build public swimming pool (required by
Rawls and Bentham, forbidden by Nozick)
were to say that following an improper meta-rule incorrectly also produces a
string of improper decisions-that is, that all decisions produced by a govern-
ment that is following an improper meta-rule are invalid-I would leave
Gordon and the courts in the following very messy stalemate. So long as
Gordon wants to follow Bentham, he cannot build the pool. But neither can he
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forego building the pool, because foregoing building the pool and wanting to
follow Bentham are no different from attempting to follow Bentham and in so
doing mistakenly deciding not to build the pool. Gordon ought to change
philosophers, of course. But until he does so, he can neither build nor forego
building the pool, which is absurd. I conclude that Gordon must be allowed to
forego building the pool, the anti-Bentham course, even if he thinks incor-
rectly that he is following Bentham thereby. A mistake saves a rule based on
an improper meta-rule, at least so long as the rule adopted is consistent with a
proper meta-rule.98
(ii) Good Meta-Rule, Bad Rule
Suppose Gordon wants to adopt the (permitted) Rawlsian alternative, but
mistakenly concludes that Rawls would require a public pool open only to
Wilbur. In fact, a public pool open only to Wilbur is the (forbidden) Bentha-
mite decision, though it is not a decision consistent with either of the per-
mitted theories (Nozick or Rawls). Should Gordon's mistake vitiate his deci-
sion? The situation is illustrated by Diagram D.
Here the mistake should render the decision unconstitutional. If the court
has correctly determined that Gordon is following a permissible meta-rule,
invalidating the decision only does what Gordon, when informed of his mis-
take, would do anyway. If the court, however, has been mistaken, and
Gordon is actully following (correctly) an impermissible meta-rule, invalidat-
ing the decision accomplishes something-return to a status quo ante that
(presumably) is consistent with a permissible meta-rule-that would not be
accomplished by Gordon himself.
(iii) Goodl Meta-Rule, Good2 Rule
Suppose that Gordon wishes to follow Rawls (permitted), but mistakenly
follows Nozick (permitted) instead and does not build the pool. Has he acted
unconstitutionally? The situation is illustrated by Diagram E.
Although it is not clear whether Gordon's mistake renders his decision
inherently unconstitutional, it is clear that a court, assuming it could establish
Gordon's mistake, should not invalidate the decision. If Gordon has really
made a mistake, he will change his decision and build the pool. If he does not
build the pool, one can legitimately infer that he is following Nozick, not
Rawls. Of course, that inference might be wrong. Gordon may just not agree
with the court that he is not doing what Rawls requires. But unless he is doing
98. When correctly following Bentham, the improper meta-rule, leads to a different decision from either
correctly following Rawls or Nozick, the proper meta-rules, and the decisionmaker makes a decision consistent
with either Rawls or Nozick while attempting to follow Bentham. one could either allow the decision to stand, or
one could require a return to the presumably legitimate status quo ante, which may or may not accord with the
same meta-rule as the decision, since neither the decision nor presumably the status quo ante accords with
Bentham.
[Vol. 42:3
19811 A METATHEORETICAL TAXONOMY
Diagram D
universe of
possible
governmental
rules
II1:
(below
point X)
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
X : see Diagram C
see Diagram C
D Gordon's rule (decision), consistent with forbidden Ben-
thamite meta-rule, inconsistent with either permissible
meta-rule (Rawls or Nozick)
D' :rule (decision) that Gordon's meta-rule (Rawls) would
require
something that both Rawls and Nozick forbid, it is hard to see why the court
should intervene.
(iv) Good Meta-Rule, Good Rule, Mistaken Connection
Suppose Gordon wishes to follow Rawls, and he decides to build the
pool, the decision in fact required by Rawls. But his intermediate inferences
regarding the relation between building the pool and complying with Rawls
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see Diagram C
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
(below
point X)
X see Diagram C
D Gordon's rule (decision), consistent with Nozick (permit-
ted)
D' rule (decision) that Gordon's meta-rule (Rawls) would re-
quire
are mistaken. Perhaps he believes that the pool will maximize the position of
the least advantaged because the swimming skills acquired by the poor will
help them in some way to overcome poverty, while in fact the pool will
maximize their position by affording them much needed relaxation. The ques-
tion is whether Gordon's mistake about the effect of building a pool vitiates
his correct-from-a-Rawlsian-perspective decision to build it.
I believe the answer should be "no." At present, Gordon is on the actual
track laid down by the permissible meta-rule that he is following. If his mis-
taken factual beliefs are not corrected and lead him off the track in future
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decisions, those decisions can be invalidated. 99 If courts had to concern
themselves not only with Gordon's meta-rule, Gordon's rule, and the relation
between the two, but also with all of Gordon's intermediate inferences, the
costs in terms of judicial burden would be enormous.
Yet, intermediate factual mistakes do give one pause, aside from their
evidentiary value in proving the ultimate meta-rule and the consistency of the
rule with the ultimate meta-rule. What I have in mind is this example. Sup-
pose Gordon wishes, permissibly, to follow Rawls, and decides correctly to
build the pool. But Gordon believes mistakenly that not allowing Betty in the
pool complies with Rawls because women are inferior swimmers and would
pose a hazard to others. Gordon therefore posts a rule proclaiming that Betty
is not allowed to swim. In fact, this latter decision does comply with Rawls,
not because, as Gordon believes, women are inferior swimmers, but because
Betty is an inferior swimmer.
I have suggested that Gordon's decision should stand. His ultimate meta-
rule-Rawls-is valid. His posted rule-Betty may not swim-is what Rawls
would require.' °° However, his intermediate meta-rule-women may not
swim-does not comply with Rawls, and that is the source of the concern.
Nonetheless, it remains indeterminate whether Gordon will act in accordance
with Rawls or in accordance with his invalid intermediate meta-rule in future
cases; and until it becomes determinate, his decision should stand.'0 '
The implications of this position are unsettling, of course, because when
a decisionmaker pursues a permissible ultimate meta-rule through rules based
on erroneous factual premises-for example, that blacks are less intelligent
than whites-the court cannot automatically invalidate the rules but must
instead ascertain whether they comply with the ultimate meta-rule for reasons
other than those held by the decisionmaker.'02 But the opposite position, that
intermediate factual errors render otherwise valid decisions invalid, would be
more unsettling.
(d) Are Laws that Represent Compromises Between Permissible
Meta-Rules Invalid?
So far we have assumed that if our decisionmaker, Gordon, is not follow-
ing a permissible meta-rule, his decisions are (with one exception 3 ) invalid.
99. See '(ii) Good Meta-Rule, Bad Rule" supra.
100. I leave aside the issue of how specific the rules of various governmental bodies may be. See Alexander
& Horton. Ingraham v. Wright: A Prinmer for Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1305,
1355-65 (1979): Alexander. Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Respossession, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 893. 915-19 (1975).
101. In Alexander. Jztroduction:Motivation andaConsitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925,933 (1978).
I stated that an impermissible meta-rule should be grounds for invalidation regardless of whether it was an
ultimate meta-rule or an intermediate one. so long as it was a sufficient motive for the rule in question. In this
Article, I am assuming that the intermediate meta-rule-the mistaken connection between the permissible
ultimate meta-rule and the rule that effectuates the ultimate meta-rule-is not a sufficient motive for any rule
once the gorernmental decisionntiaker realizes the mistake.
102. Usually they will not square; for that reason, intermediate mistakes are grounds for a strong presump-
tion of unconstitutional effects. See text accompanying note 196 infra.
103. See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
But suppose that we replace Gordon with a collective decisionmaker whose
members are the Rawlsians, David' 4 and Frank,'0 5 and the Nozickians,
Bernie'1 6 and Ralph.' 07 David and Frank, after consulting Rawls, vote in favor
of operating as a public pool a swimming pool that was bequeathed to the
town, a decision that will cost public funds. Moreover, they believe that a
fairly large expenditure for lifeguards and deck chairs is mandated by Rawls.
Bernie and Ralph, however, after consulting Nozick, vote to sell the pool
rather than operate it at taxpayer expense. To break the stalemate, which has
resulted in an unused, unsold swimming pool, a result no one likes, the legisla-
tors agree to a compromise: operate the pool as a public pool, but with a much
more modest budget than Rawls would require. The questions are: are some
such compromises between Rawls and Nozick (our examples of permissible
meta-rules) permissible, and if so, are all such compromises permissible?
If we answer that no such compromises are permissible, that government
must be purely Rawlsian or purely Nozickian, for example, then our position
is almost as revolutionary as the pure nonoptional position, the position that
required pursuit of one and only one set of ultimate moral principles. All we
have done if we require either pure Rawls or pure Nozick is to give the
government one basic choice instead of none. Therefore, it appears that to
retain optionality, either some positions that are compromises between
optional meta-rules should be allowed (illustrated by Diagram F), or else a
weak substantive position, one that allows most conceivable meta-rules and
rules out only a few, should be adopted.
I shall discuss the latter alternative-a weak substantive position-when
I turn to John Ely's view of equal protection.'o At this point I shall focus on
the former alternative represented by Diagram F and ask how permissible
compromise positions between our Rawlsian and Nozickian meta-rules are
possible. Recall that the area of our rectangle of possible governmental rules
that lies above point X-the area of "privileges" (optional benefits and
burdens)-is an area in which no individual is worse off than he could be
under at least one of the two permitted options: a purely Rawlsian or purely
Nozickian world. Below point X, however, unless the governmental rule lies
in the cross-hatched area required by both Rawls and Nozick, at least one
individual is worse off than he would be under either Rawls or Nozick.
Governmental rules below point X and outside the cross-hatched area are
unconstitutional. What about governmental acts above point X and between
the Rawlsian and Nozickian poles? These rules are forbidden by both Rawls
and Nozick, and one could say, therefore, that they are also unconstitutional.
As I said, that would leave government with only two options-in our
104. D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977).
105. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View ofRawls" Theory oflustice. 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
106. B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
107. Winter. Poverty, Economic Equality and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. Cr. REV. 41.
108. See text accompanying notes 131-33 infra.
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Diagram F
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
I ] : see Diagram C
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X see Diagram C
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point X)
hypothetical, a high-budget public pool (Rawls) or no public pool (Nozick)-a
result that is both revolutionary and counter-intuitive.
On the other hand, one could say that because a rule in that area makes
no one worse off than he could be under a permissible option (pure Rawls or
pure Nozick), any rule in that area is constitutional. Thus, all cases of dis-
crimination with respect to optional benefits and burdens-for example,
public pools for whites but not for blacks, for old residents but not new
universe of
possible
governmental
rules
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residents, for Democrats but not Republicans, and so forth-are to be tested
by whether the challenged rule makes at least someone worse off than he
would be under both Rawls and Nozick and thus lies in the blank area belows
point X. All cases of unconstitutional discriminations regarding constitution-
ally optional benefits and burdens would lie in that area.
This analysis can explain our intuitions (and actual case holdings) in a
large number of cases. For example, some optional benefits, when awarded
unequally, render the person who receives the lesser benefit worse off than
had he and the others received no benefit at all, because the benefit is com-
petitive in nature. I may be better off if my school board is appointed than if I
have one vote for school board members and you have two. Public educa-
tion-at least some aspects of it-may be subject to the same analysis. So,
too, may be governmental subsidies of certain ideological positions.'°9 Other
unequal provisions of benefits may be subject to the same analysis because
they penalize and thus deter the exercise of a liberty that both Rawls and
Nozick would protect against penalty."0 Still other unequal provisions may
place one below point X because they dry up alternative private sources of
funding for the optional benefits in question."' And still other unequal provi-
sions may create secondary harms that leave someone below point X." 2 Thus,
a great many cases that we intuit as being instances of unconstitutional dis-
criminations or unconstitutional conditions regarding optional benefits may
turn out to be cases only apparently above point X but actually below it.
But there are rules in the blank area above point X that also seem uncon-
stitutional. "Greater welfare to whites than to blacks" appears to be an un-
constitutional rule even if no one is worse off than he or she would be under one
of the pure permissible meta-rules. Can the unconstitutionality of such a rule be
explained other than by the fact that the rule is not purely Rawlsian or purely
Nozickian-Rawls and Nozick being our assumed permissible meta-rules-an
explanation that would wipe out all but one option and leave all blank areas on
our diagram as areas of unconstitutionality?
I believe the answer to both questions is "yes." Some, but not all, rules
in the blank area above point X are unconstitutional. The rules in that area
that are constitutional are those rules that, in conjunction with all other rules
enacted within that area, form a valid compromise meta-rule. A valid com-
promise meta-rule is, in turn, a meta-rule whose distance from the pure
109. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 940-41
n.54 (1978); authorities cited in note 57 supra; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 809-11 (1978).
110. Revoking all welfare payments if one chooses an abortion or voices support for socialism may be good
examples.
I 1l. Thus, if under Nozick the poor would get no welfare but would receive charity proportionate to need
from many of the wealthy, a regime of high welfare for whites but low welfare for blacks, which regime taxed
wealthy blacks as well as wealthy whites, might leave the black poor worse offthan they would be under Nozick
without any welfare whatsoever. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionalit. 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 925, 940-41 n.54 (1978).
112. For instance, more welfare to whites than to blacks may cause psychic harm to blacks, or stimulate
private discrimination against blacks, to the extent that the black poor are worse off in absolute terms than had
no welfare been given anyone. See Brest, Foreword: lit Defense of the Antidiscriniation Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REV. I. 8-12 (1976).
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Rawlsian meta-rule is entirely explained by Nozickian motives (and cor-
responding effects), and whose distance from the pure Nozickian meta-rule is
entirely explained by Rawlsian motives (and corresponding effects).
Diagram G displays the difference between constitutional and unconstitu-
tional compromise meta-rules.
Diagram G
X
CMR
9
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
see Diagram C
LI : see Diagram C
(below
point X)
X see Diagram C
L13 see Diagram F
(above
point X)
Paralll compromise meta-rules
Nonparallel compromise meta-ruleN
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The valid compromise meta-rules, CMRI-CMR 8, all run parallel to the
Rawlsian and Nozickian permissible meta-rules. The parallelism represents
the fact that Rawlsian reasons explain the compromise meta-rules' lying to the
left of Nozick, and Nozickian reasons explain their lying to the right of Rawls.
The one pictured invalid compromise meta-rule, CMR 9, runs across the dia-
gram at an angle. That fact suggests that the entire set of rules that comprise
CMR 9 cannot be explained solely as a compromise between Rawls and
Nozick. Thus, had our legislators-David, Frank, Bernie, and Ralph-settled
on a relatively luxurious public pool for Wilbur and a less luxurious public
pool for Betty, something other than the tension between Rawls and Nozick
would appear to be necessary to explain the discrimination. Similarly, if they
had settled on a very small redistribution of wealth in the form of essential
health care, but as much redistribution of wealth as Rawls would allow in the
form of cosmetic surgery, the discrimination again would appear to be in-
explicable solely as a compromise between Rawls and Nozick. Both discrimi-
nations appear to be part of nonparallel meta-rules that are defined by factors
in addition to Rawls-versus-Nozick, such as sexism (in the first example).
Of course, the appearance that a set of rules in the blank area above point
X falls within a nonparallel, and hence invalid, meta-rule may be rebutted.
Perhaps the luxurious pool for Wilbur but not Betty can be explained by
factors such as efficiency that would show that the discrimination in fact lies
within a parallel meta-rule. Those factors would, of course, have to be the
actual motivating factors and would have to be justified by the actual effects.
But equal distribution of optional benefits is not always, and perhaps not
often, required in order to fall within a meta-rule that is parallel between, say,
Rawls and Nozick.
This concept of parallel compromise meta-rules thus explains how some,
but not all, acts within the blank area above point X can be unconstitu-
tional,"13 and why not all true instances of unconstitutional conditions on, or
unconstitutional discriminations regarding, privileges are instances in the
blank area below point X, where someone is worse off than the permissible
meta-rules (here, Rawls and Nozick) would permit.
At this point then I have covered the various substantive theories of
equal protection. In all of them, equal protection violations are instances of
comparative harm that are not objectively necessary to serve legitimate gov-
ernmental purposes. Legitimate governmental purposes in turn are defined by
the one moral theory embodied in the Constitution (on the nonoptional view),
by the two or more permitted moral theories or compromise positions among
113. In other articles, instead of talking about parallel meta-rules, I talked about a plane between egalitar-
ianism and libertarianism, movements off of which plane defined unconstitutional arbitrariness. See Alexander
& Horton, Ingraham v. Wright: A Pritner for Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1305.
1368-69 n.235 (1979); Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893, 900-01 n.27 (1975). In the former article I also pointed out the relation between
substantive arbitrariness and procedural arbitrariness. For a slightly different perspective on whether there can
be permissible compromises between permissible purposes, see Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality as
Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1086-89 (1980).
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them (on the optional view), or as any purposes that do not entail production
of specific impermissible effects (on the view that equal protection merely
forbids producing such effects).
(2) Process Theories for Evaluating Governmental Rules
(a) Process Theories in General
We turn now to theories that evaluate governmental rules allocating
optional benefits and burdens by the process of deliberation from which the
rules emerge, and not directly by the effects of the rules themselves.
Suppose that Gordon has decided to build a public pool but restrict its use
to Wilbur. And suppose that Gordon's decision to do so is based on his
personal dislike for Betty and his desire to spite her. Our process theorist
might tell us that we need go no further in determining the constitutionality of
Gordon's decision. We need not assess the effects of the regime of a public
pool for Wilbur and none for Betty. The fact that Gordon is motivated to
establish such a regime by his dislike for Betty in itself renders his decision
invalid.
What explains our process theorist's preoccupation with Gordon's mo-
tives and his unconcern with the effects of Gordon's rule? If the theorist is
interested in determining the real rule that Gordon is implementing-what I
have called Gordon's "meta-rule"-then the process theorist is really no
different from the substantive theorist, who also is interested in Gordon's
meta-rule; the process theorist still must employ a substantive theory to
assess Gordon's meta-rule.
Another unpromising explanation for the process theorist's concern with
Gordon's motives is that certain motives, such as Gordon's hostility toward
Betty, cause the objects of those motives to feel stigmatized and to resent the
decision. I say this explanation is unpromising, not because the concern with
process is really a concern with the social effects of the process, but because
the explanation is much too strong to be acceptable. Suppose, for example,
that Betty is a notoriously poor swimmer, a serious danger to herself and
others when in a swimming pool. Gordon knows this and decides for this
reason to exclude Betty from the public pool. Betty resents and feels stigma-
tized by Gordon's rule because she resents and feels stigmatized by Gordon's
(correct) assessment of her swimming ability and the hazards her swimming
would create. Surely her feelings of stigma and resentment should not be the
basis for holding Gordon's rule unconstitutional, just as the resentful feelings
of a guilty and properly tried criminal that he was stigmatized by his convic-
tion should not be a ground for holding the conviction unconstitutional. There
is stigma, and there is stigma; there is resentment, and there is resentment.
Some stigma is deserved; some resentment is unjustified. We can only be
concerned with stigma and resentment when the stigma is both real and un-
deserved, and resentment is appropriate.
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The process theorist who focuses on the decisionmaker's motives be-
cause of the relation between certain motives and feelings of stigma and
resentment must have at hand some moral theory for deciding when stigma is
deserved and when those affected by rules can justifiably feel undeservedly
stigmatized and/or resentful.1 4 In other words, a substantive moral theory is
114. The absence of such a moral theory is the defect in Donald Regan's recent article, Regan, Rewriting
Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). Regan argues that Roe v. Wade, in which the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional bans on previability abortions, was correctly decided, but that it should have been decided on
equal protection, not due process, grounds. In essence, Regan maintains that the Court should have avoided the
philosophical swampland of determining, as it did, the moral and constitutional protectibility of the fetus in an
unconditional manner. The Court's course required it to engage in moral philosophy and to answer one of moral
philosophy's most difficult questions, the question of what beings are morally considerable, and why. (The
phrase "morally considerable" comes from Kenneth Goodpaster. Goodpaster, On Being Morally' Considerable,
75 J. PHIL. 308 (1978).) This the Court was ill-equipped to do. Instead, says Regan, the Court should have
assumed that fetuses are morally considerable, but that any duty owed the fetus not to abort it is a positive duty
of aid. a duty of Good Samaritanism. (The philosophical literature on abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, and the
killing of animals is burgeoning. One good collection, among many, of essays on these subjects is MATTERS OF
LIFE AND DEATH (T. Regan ed. 1980). The progenitor of Regan's argument, which Regan acknowledges,
Regan, Rei'riting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1576 n.4 (1979), is Judith Jarvis Thomson's article, A
Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).)
Treating the duty not to abort as a duty of Good Samaritanism would appear to toss the Court from the
philosophical frying pan of the fetus' moral status to the philosophical fire of the enforceability of positive
duties. Indeed, it is plausible to believe that the enforceability of positive duties is the central issue within the
liberal tradition, the issue that divides libertarian-liberals from welfare-statist liberals. The Court is probably as
ill-equipped to grapple with such an issue as it is to answer the question of the fetus' moral status, and the
implications of its resolving the issue against enforceable duties to aid would be enormous. Not only would
intra-familial duties, as well as the other Good Samaritan duties, especially duties to serve as a witness or a
draftee, be suspect, but so too would be much taxation. Although it is uncertain exactly how much taxation is a
redistributive imposition of a positive, albeit conditional, duty to labor on behalf of the less fortunate, no doubt
much of it is. (I believe that Robert Nozick's argument that redistributive taxation is tantamount to forced labor
is correct. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169-72 (1975). Basically, if one must labor a
certain amount to survive, and if the product of that amount of one's labor is taxed, then the effect of the tax is
to coerce, upon pain of nonsurvival. labor beyond that amount necessary for survival. Charles Fried's consump-
tion tax would also be a tax on productive labor, despite Fried's insistence to the contrary. See C. FRIED,
RIGHT AND WRONG 147-49 (1978). 1 discuss Fried's position more fully in a forthcoming book analyzing
libertarian theory. L. ALEXANDER, MODERN LIBERTARIAN THEORY: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM.) If the
Court could have found abortion laws unconstitutional only upon either finding enforcement of positive duties
unconstitutional or finding the fetus to be morally unprotectible, the latter course appears less far-reaching if not
less difficult.
Regan, however, believes the Court could have avoided both of these moral philosophical issues and still
held abortion laws unconstitutional. All that the Court needed to do was to compare the positive duty imposed
on pregnant women to carry unwanted fetuses to term with the few other positive duties imposed by law.
According to Regan, no other class of persons is held to so onerous a positive duty to aid another individual.
even when the latter's life is at stake, as the class of pregnant women. Therefore, he concludes, the Court could
and should have decided that anti-abortion laws violate the principle of comparative justice embodied in the
equal protection clause without deciding either of the two difficult noncomparative justice issues mentioned.
namely, the issues of the moral status of the fetus and the enforceability of positive duties.
I think Regan's argument for this proposition needs a lot of shoring up. although I'm not prepared to assess
the argument fully in this Article. Briefly, Regan believes the positive duty imposed by anti-abortion laws is
more onerous than the positive duty imposed by military conscription because the latter is not imposed for the
benefit of specific individuals. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1606-07 (1979). Why this
distinction, if it can be made at all, matters is left unclear. We are apparently to intuit the difference and also
intuit it in favor of the pregnant woman. I have to confess that my intuitions tell me less than Regan's here.
Regan dismisses duties of children to support their parents, which duties cannot be avoided by giving up the
parents for adoption, id. at 1597, as merely monetary. Id. at 1609. But monetary burdens for most of us translate
into burdens of labor, burdens that might be very onerous indeed for the child whose source of income is hard
physical labor and whose impoverished parents need support for a long period of time. So in filial duties of
support-and also in duties of fathers to support unwanted children. id. at 1598 n.36-we have examples of
positive duties to aid specific individuals through the labor coerced by a form of taxation.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly given Regan's assumption that no parent could ever be compelled to
donate an organ to a child, id. at 1586, assume that a mother and her nursing infant are on a cruise when a
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shipwreck leaves them stranded on an uninhabited island. The mother, a good swimmer, can swim to a nearby
island that is a frequent stop for ships. Unfortunately, in the time it will take her to swim to that island and get
help, her baby will die. Alternatively, she can remain on the present island and nurse and care for the infant for
nine months until the next cruise ship comes by. The latter course of action will be quite taxing physically.
Regan must assume that the law would not impose a duty on the mother to remain and care for the child. [ would
not make such an assumption.
Underlying Regan's argument is an assumption that he makes explicit at the end of his article, that is, that
the judgments of comparative justice called for by the equal protection clause are somehow easier for the Court
to make than the noncomparative judgments that Regan thinks the Court should have avoided in Roe, or at least
that the comparative judgments do not involve moral philosophy. See teyt accompanying notes 211-16 infra.
Thus, in his penultimate paragraph. Regan writes:
If I had been writing an essay about moral philosophy instead of about constitutional law, I would have
made the argument in favor of abortion turn centrally on the proposition that a fetus is not a person. I
would not have relied on the proposition that there is no general duty to aid a person in serious danger
even when one can do so at trivial cost to oneself. I would not have appealed to any notion that
corporal punishment is impermissible, nor indeed would I have given the same negative weight to
physical invasions generally that I do in the present essay. I would not have claimed that there is a right
to kill an innocent rapist. However, I have not been writing about moral philosophy. I have been
writing about American constitutional law. For reasons I cannot explain here, I think the projects are
quite different.
Id. at 1645-46.
It is Regan's point that his equal protection analysis steers clear of moral philosophy that I. of course. deny.
Equal protection analysis, especially extended beyond racial discriminations--indeed, extended beyond the
racial discriminations specifically condemned by the fourteenth amendment's Framers-leads unavoidably to
moral judgments and hence to moral philosophy. [ will illustrate this point by focusing upon Regan's leap from
the position that anti-abortion laws impose more onerous burdens of Good Samaritanism than do any other laws
to his position that anti-abortion laws violate equal protection.
How does Regan make this leap? How does he get from the 'fact,- if I can call it a -fact," that women
restricted from having abortions are our most onerously burdened Good Samaritans, to the conclusion that
equal protection is violated? Mere inequality of burden will not do the trick, for it is clearly incorrect to assume
that equal protection requires that everyone in society be equally burdened. What about wrongdoers, for
example?
Regan needs some sort of model of equal protection. Moreover, for his purposes it must be a model that
makes no reference to such moral-philosophical notions as "'desert," "justice," and so forth. It must by all
means skirt the relative merits of egalitarianism, libertarianism, and other 'isms.'" Otherwise, we are right back
into answering those tough philosophical questions we set out to avoid.
I would be unfair to Regan if I held him deficient in not providing us with a full-blown and noncontroversial
theory of equal protection. especially since he acknowledges that he does not have such a theory. Id. at 1624.
Nonetheless I think it's fair to hold Regan to the claim that, because equal protection analysis is not moral
theory, an equal protection model can be produced that avoids the hard philosophical questions mentioned.
On its face the contention that we canjustify an application of a vague norm like equal protection, especially
outside the core cases the Framers had in mind, without recourse to moral theory strikes me as odd, if not
incoherent. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, so how does Regan's pudding taste?
Regan first tells us that the woman who desires an abortion is somewhere in the middle in terms ofeligibility
to be a Good Samaritan. Id. at 1622-23. How do we determine such relative eligibility? It is self-evident? I would
contend that judgments of relative eligibility are formed against the background of a moral theory and are only as
justifiable as that theory.
Even if eligibility for Good Samaritanism is somehow theory-neutral, what of the implied claim that the
burdens of Good Samaritanism should be scaled proportionately to such eligibility? If that claim is not analytic-
packed into the concept of eligibility itself-it surely requires a moral theory to justify it.
Regan calls his equal protection approach the *'reasonable American legislature test.- Id. at 1627. A law
violates equal protection if a reasonable American legislature, fully apprised of the *'costs" of the inequality
created and the "'benefits" obtained therefrom, would enact the law. Such a test, however, obviously relies on a
moral theory about what effects government may and may not produce. The word "reasonable" in Regan's test
discloses the reliance on a background moral theory. for unless Regan means by reasonable something purely
descriptive, such as how the average legislature would in fact act. we cannot assess what a reasonable legislature
will do unless we know what is reasonable to do.
Regan is up a moral creek without a moral paddle. We are told the costs of inequality vary with the "degree
of suspectness" of the classification employed by the law. Id. at 1626, 1628, 1632-33. (Regan's discussion on
this point is confusing. but I read him as saying that a bad governmental purpose means a hidden suspect
classification, not that a suspect classification suggests a bad governmental purpose.) What is apparently
involved here is the very interesting notion that suspect classifications are important to equal protection because
they impose some special objective harms on members of the suspect class, not, as the more prevalent view
would have it. because they raise a suspicion that the legislature was not employing the right conception of
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necessarily prior to a process theory built on stigma and resentment." 5
When supplemented by a moral theory that identifies the relevant in-
stances of stigma and resentment, the process theorist's explanation for his
concern with motives is no longer too strong. Now, however, it appears too
weak. If we have in hand a moral theory that allows us to assess governmental
rules in terms of their moral justifiability, why should we concern ourselves
with only that subset of morally unjustifiable rules that gives rise to feelings of
stigma and resentment? Is a constitutional theory plausible that directs us to
ignore injustices whenever the victims do not perceive or do not resent those
injustices? I think not.
The process theorist must therefore be concerned with the decisionmak-
moral worthiness. See text accompanying notes 182-85 infra. The latter view of suspect classifications obvi-
ously leads eventually to arguments over moral theory, since each moral theory implies a different conception of
absolute and relative moral worthiness. Regan's notion of suspect classifications appears to avoid moral theory
and conceptions of moral worthiness by focusing on objective hartns caused by classifications rather than on
controversial injustices suspected because of the classifications.
But to the extent Regan's notion avoids moral theory, it becomes quite mysterious. What is so special
constitutionally about those harms caused by. say, racial classifications? Why should resentnent (the harm
Regan apparently believes is caused by suspect classifications) over, say, racial inequalities matter more than
resentment over classifications that distinguish opticians from optometrists? See id. at 1630-31. And should all
resentment caused by inequality-imposing classifications be considered in the equal protection balance, or only
that resentment that is mnorall justified? These questions, as well as the question of what resentment is justified.
are obviously all moral questions. (The status of "external preferences" and other "'moralisms*" within conse-
quentialist moral theories is hotly debated in moral philosophy. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY 234-39. 275-78 (1977); N. RESCHER, UNSELFISHNESS 70-97 (1975); Baker, Counting Preferences in
Collective Choice Situations, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381 (1978); Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
MORALITY 113, 133-34 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).)
Regan also mentions that the harms imposed on some women by anti-abortion laws are of special concern
because they cumulate with the harms from past unjust treatment. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1569, 1632 (1979). To the extent cumulative harms merely explain resentment, they add nothing new to
Regan's general analysis of suspect classifications. To the extent they suggest "unjust" harms apart from
resentment, they obviously require a theory of distributive and compensatory justice as a backdrop.
Regan tells us that the "fundamental interests" implicated in anti-abortion law-nonsubordination of one
person to another, and freedom from physical invasion-also count in his "reasonable American legislature"
equal protection test, even though we may assume that there is nothing unconstitutional per se-i.e., in a
noncomparative sense-in so burdening persons. Id. at 1630-31, 1635. Because Regan does not want to relate
these inequalities regarding fundamental interests directly to a theory of justice, a course that too obviously
involves moral philosophy, he instead relates them, like suspect classifications, to the "cost" of resentment and
goes no further. I hope by now the reader is persuaded that Regan did not go far enough.
Finally, just how does a "reasonable American legislature" weigh and balance the resentment costs (and
other costs) of inequality-creating classifications against the benefits sought to be gained through use of those
classifications? Which benefits can legitimately be counted? How are they to be weighed against costs? Re-
course to moral theory utlimately is required here as well.
115. Of course, some consequentialist moral theories, like utilitarianism, might have to weigh in the moral
calculus even unjustifiable (from a utilitarian's perspective) feelings of stigma and resentment. In other words, a
consequentialist may have to consider, as part of the relevant consequences, the effects of immoral and
incorrect moral beliefs. This is a notorious difficulty with consequentialist theories, one that I shall not and need
not pursue here. See the authorities cited in note 114 supra. But it does have implications for the decisionmaker
under a Constitution that requires or permits him or her to pursue a consequentialist moral position, especially
when it comes to the question of how the decisionmaker is to factor in the impermissible moral positions and
incorrect factual beliefs of the populace. If a constitutional "ight" is based on consequentialist reasoning of this
sort, then the scope of the right or its application may very well be affected by, for example, others' attempts to
deprive people of the right. Compare Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958)(threats of violence in the context of
school integration), with Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)(threats of interracial violence in the context of
the decision whether to segregate prisoners). Indeed, a decisionmaker might even be permitted or required
constitutionally to take into account the effect of a decision on his or her chances for reelection. See also
Alexander. Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925. 945-46 (1978).
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ing process for its own sake, not because of the reactions people might have to
it. Indeed, most major process theories do rest primarily on some notion of a
fair process and only secondarily on the untoward social effects of unfair
processes. But process theorists ultimately identify as examples of procedural
unfairness either (I) the unfairness that results from basing a decision on an
improper moral theory or (2) the unfairness that results from basing a decision
on incorrect factual beliefs." 6 Thus, take two different instances in which
Gordon decides to build a pool for Wilbur and not for Betty. In one instance
Gordon does so because he believes that women are morally inferior beings,
not entitled to equal concern and respect. In the other instance he does so
because he believes that women cannot swim. In the first instance he has
made an error in his choice of moral principles. In the second he has made a
factual error. Both types of error can lead to the same unjustifiable rule, and
both can be lumped under the heading of "prejudice" infecting the decision-
making process. Finally, although they are different types of error, either type
might be classified as a form of procedural unfairness.
It should be obvious, however, based on the discussion in the preceding
sections, that process theories that are concerned with prejudice (error) of
either sort are really indistinguishable from substantive theories. A substan-
tive theory that permits options will require that the decisionmaker in fact be
acting in pursuance of one of the permitted moral theories-that is, that he not
be acting in pursuance of improper moral principles and their implied view of
moral worthiness. Moreover, a substantive theory will require not only that at
the time of the challenge to the rule, the decisionmaker is still acting in
pursuance of a permitted theory, but also that the effects of his rule actually
accord with that theory-that is, that he has not made a means/ends mistake.
Nor would a process theory differ, for it too must require a legitimate present
view of moral worth and also that the present effects of a decision be con-
sistent with acting on that view. After all, how can a decisionmaker credibly
claim to continue to be acting in pursuance of a proper moral theory after it is
proved in a lawsuit that his rule produces effects inconsistent with those
effects required by the theory?"
17
Let us go back to Gordon, Betty, and Wilbur. Under a substantive
theory, Gordon's decision whether to build the pool and whom to allow to
swim is evaluated according to (1) whether the decision is consistent in its
effects with one of the permitted ultimate theories (say, Rawls or Nozick) and
(2) whether the decision was made in pursuance of that theory (whether that
theory was the meta-rule). Under a process theory, when we are concerned
with whether Gordon acts on the proper view of Betty's and Wilbur's moral
worth, what will be the difference? We still need to ask whether Gordon's
116. 1 hope that the reader will go along with this rough division between improper moral and incorrect
factual beliefs and not challenge me on meta-ethical grounds. I am fully aware that the relation between
"values" and "'facts" may be far more complex than my division suggests.
117. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 932-33
n.30 (1978).
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moral theory, from which he derives his judgments of moral worth, is one of
the permitted ones, and we still need to ask if his rule produces effects con-
sistent with that theory. (If it does not, and he is so apprised, how can he
claim that he is still acting according to the permitted theory when he does not
alter his rule?) I conclude that there are no process theories of equal protec-
tion that are tenable and yet not dependent on and reducible to substantive
theories. ' 8 The important questions in equal protection theory concern
whether the decisionmaker has substantive options and, if so, whether these
options are defined in terms of ultimate moral positions or in terms of the
avoidance of specific effects, such as harm to a racial group, that are only
contingently related to any ultimate moral position.
(b) John Ely's Attempt at a Pure Process Theory:
Equal Protection and Representation-Reinforcement
I have denied that a plausible process theory of equal protection-one
that does not collapse into a substantive theory-can be constructed."9 Yet
John Ely, one of the subjects of this Symposium, claims that his theory of
equal protection does not rest on a substantive theory of fundamental moral
values but rests solely on the constitutionally referable procedural value of
equal participation in the democratic process. I maintain, however, that to the
extent that Ely applies equal protection beyond the award of the franchise to
decisions allocating other benefits and burdens, he must employ a substantive
moral theory.
To begin with, Ely views equal protection, along with the ninth amend-
ment and the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause, as
what I have called a neo-interpretivist provision-that is, an empty-vessel
provision that represents a delegation of authority to future decisionmakers to
supply the values necessary for fleshing it out. 20 Ely, eschewing moral
philosophy and other extra-constitutional sources for equal protection's flesh,
comes up with "broad participation in the processes and distributions of
government" 2 ' as a value implicit in the constitutional scheme viewed as a
whole. But, aside from the point, ably expressed by others,'22 that Ely fails to
justify the imposition of his implied-from-the-Constitution conception of
democracy against the will of the branches that are constituted according to
an expressed-in-the-Constitution conception of democracy, Ely fails to estab-
118. See also Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162. 1175-79 (1977).
119. On the relation of process to substance in other areas, see L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 501-63 (1978); Alexander & Horton, Ingraham v. Wright: A Prinerfor Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1305. 1351-88 (1979); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
120. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
121. ELY. supra note 1. at 87.
122. See M. PERRY. THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS; Lynch, Book Review, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 862-63 (1980); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1071 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1047-51 (1980).
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lish that his use of equal protection to invalidate democratically made deci-
sions can be justified in terms of democratic participation viewed as a pro-
cedural, not a substantive, value.
Ely maintains the function of equal protection is to eliminate a particular
form of impediment in the democratic process, namely, prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities-the "they's," who are different from and
inferior (so it is believed) to the "we's" in the legislature. Despite difficulties
in principled and consistent elaboration,'2 Ely's "we-they" test for "suspect
classifications" could perhaps prove quite valuable to courts in determining
when a violation of equal protection-improper meta-rule or improper ef-
fects-is probable and thus when close judicial scrutiny of the governmental
rule is worth its cost in terms of time, money, risk of error, and intragovern-
mental good will.' 24 But how can the suspected evil behind a "we-they"
distinction-prejudice-be considered a purely procedural defect, unrelated
to a substantive moral theory?
Earlier' -5 I distinguished two forms of "prejudice": (I) improper moral
principles-for example, principles that dictate that blacks are of inferior
moral worth; and (2) inaccurate factual beliefs-for example, a belief that
blacks are less intelligent than whites. The first form of prejudice is clearly
dependent on a substantive moral theory. It cannot serve as the basis for a
value-free, purely process-oriented jurisprudence of equal protection. Equal
protection might allow government to follow a desert-based moral theory and
thus treat murderers with less respect than others. 126 Or it might forbid desert-
based moral theories on Rawlsian or Nozickian grounds. 127 But to the extent
that equal protection rules out or rules in any ultimate standard of moral
worth, it is unquestionably substantive.
28
Other areas of the Constitution-for instance, the dormant commerce
clause and the interstate privileges and immunities clause-that deal with
state governmental treatment of the interests of those (citizens of other states)
without direct representation in that government, unquestionably demand
123. See Tribe, The Puzzing Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063,
1073-77 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory. 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1052-53 (1980). Is a law that principally burdens whites, passed by a legislature
comprised of a large minority of racist blacks and a diverse majority of whites, the product of a "we-they"
distinction? That type of question suggests that Ely's test, though useful, cannot be employed mechanically.
124. See text accompanying notes 182-87 infra.
125. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
126. Tribe uses burglars as his example to make the same point. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1075 (1980).
127. Rawls objects to desert-based theories on the ground that the characteristics on which desert ascrip-
tions are premised are solely the result of the natural lottery. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 310-15 (1971).
As I have elsewhere pointed out, it is conceivable that a Rawlsian, applying maximin to everyone, including
criminals, might have to reward criminals rather than punish them, since those being punished must be con-
sidered in determining who is the least advantaged. See Alexander, The Doomtsday Machine: Proportionality,
Punishment and Precention, 63 MONIST 199, 200 (1980). Libertarians like Nozick, who object to desert-based
distributions generally, also have difficulty with finding any limiting principles for punishment. See id. at 220
n.5.
128. See Tribe. The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories. 89 YALE L.J. 1063,
1076 (1980).
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that the unrepresented be treated as having equal worth. Unlike resident
blacks, who can vote and elect representatives, nonresidents must be ac-
corded some form of "virtual representation" through a requirement of equal
regard.129 Ely would claim that even groups that are represented in the gov-
ernment, such as blacks, must be accorded the same equal regard as the
unrepresented, and that this is the distinct contribution of equal protection to
the constitutional scheme. 130 (The equal moral worth of blacks is also the only
coherent premise behind extending them the franchise in the fifteenth amend-
ment.)
If this is Ely's view, then Ely is clearly committed to a substantive
value-equal regard-that goes beyond representation. Of course, although
some moral theories-for example, racist or sexist ones-are ruled out by
such a view, until the proper conception of equal regard-Rawlsian, Nozick-
ian, Benthamite, and so forth-is identified, equal protection is a very weak
constraint on government, one pretty much irrelevant to most contemporary
governmental decisions disadvantaging minority groups. "' This view of equal
protection as incorporating a weak substantive value may be an acceptable
compromise for Ely, who does not want equal protection to rest on moral
theory, but who cannot have an equal protection premised solely on demo-
cratic representation without rendering it too weak to invalidate any non-
mistaken democratic decisions.
The second form of "prejudice--the factual mistake form-can serve as
a useful adjunct to a substantive view of equal protection, and I have at-
tempted to delineate the proper role of mistakes. 32 But if Ely wishes to treat
mistakes as violations of equal protection without regard to ultimate moral
principles, then his position is subject to the reductio ad absurdum of all pure
mistake theories: so long as the government is pursuing evil ends through
means that are well-suited to those ends, it does not violate equal protection.
I think, given the untenability of a pure mistake theory and the ineluct-
ably substantive nature of a theory that allows one to distinguish permissible
and impermissible views of moral worth, that Ely should be read as holding a
weak substantive theory, one that rules out the moral inferiority of blacks as
an ultimate moral principle, but rules out very little else-for example, the
ultimate moral views that permit criminals to be accorded less moral concern
and that permit the capitalist system to exist. Ely's is therefore both a sub-
stantive and an optional view of equal protection, with the optional area much
broader-inclusive of many more permissible meta-rules-than merely, say,
Rawls and Nozick. Ely's position is illustrated by Diagram H.
129. ELY, supra note I, at 82-84.
130. Id. at 82.
131. It is just as likely in today's world that minority groups will be disadvantaged by colorblind utilitarian
values as by overtly racist ones. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 925, 945 (1978); Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality as Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal
Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1056 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of
John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1056 (1980).
132. See text accompanying notes 89-101 supra.
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Diagram H
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~ area of rules forbidden by specific, interpretive constitutional
provisions that define the democratic process
-" - :area of rules required by specific, interpretive constitutional
provisions that define the democratic process
7 area of permissible, but not required. rules
11111 I |
area of rules forbidden by the equal protection clause because
I I I | reflect a racist or sexist meta-rule
The problem with all optional views of equal protection-views that per-
mit more than one but not all possible moral theories to serve as meta-rules--
is that the weaker they are (the more options they permit), the more founda-
tionless they appear to be. How is it that we can rule out an ultimate moral
principle of white (or male) moral superiority without producing arguments
that would also rule out some, and perhaps all but one, of the other moral
theories presumably permitted-radical egalitarian, communitarian,
Rawlsian, Nozickian, Benthamite, Benthamite sans external preferences,
desert-based, and perfectionist? Each theory has a specific conception of
moral worth and its bases. Ruling out racist (or sexist) conceptions of moral
worth, but remaining totally agnostic with respect to all other conceptions, is
philosophically problematic."'
133. See Alexander. Introduction: Motivation and Constittionalitv, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 945. 947
(1978).
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Of course, one can cite the fifteenth (and nineteenth) amendment as
evidence that the constitutional scheme of which equal protection is a part
rules out any moral theory that includes a principle of white (and male)
superiority. The point is, however, that the constitutional scheme makes
more sense if it rules out racism and sexism as part of ruling out a great many
moral views and permitting very few, than if it merely rules out those specific
views and permits almost all others.'
34
Others have noted that Ely's "process" view makes sense only against a
background of a substantive view.'35 Indeed, some, like Frank Michelman,
have argued that Ely's equal participation value really implies a whole
panoply of substantive rights. The concept of equal worth that Ely holds
does not merely exclude a racist meta-rule; it demands a pro-Rawlsian one.
13 6
Although I am certain Ely would reject Michelman's strong substantive
interpretation, and although I do not believe that ruling out a particular con-
ception of moral worth such as the racist conception can only be justified from
the perspective of a single alternative conception like Rawls', I believe
Michelman's interpretation lends credence to my claim that extremely weak
substantive theories, as I interpret Ely's to be, are most difficult to justify.
Edwin Baker has interpreted Ely's "process" theory-his nonsubstan-
tive, value-neutral, participation view of equal protection-in still a different
134. As an alternative to reading Ely's position as a weak substantive one, one might read Ely as holding a
stronger substantive theory of equal protection-perhaps even a nonoptional one-but one that permits judicial
intervention only when the legislature is unlikely to rectify its moral mistake in the foreseeable future because of
the political underrepresentation of the victims of governmental immorality, that is, their discreteness and
insularity. See United States v. Carolene Products Co.. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Such a view, however,
is difficult to justify. Presumably, under this view the courts could as easily recognize immoral treatment of
persons who were not underrepresented politically as they could recognize immoral treatment of the protected
minorities. If so. the mere fact that the legislature does not face the impediment of underrepresentation in
recognizing and correcting its moral errors hardly justifies a court's sitting idly by and knowingly allowing
injustices to persist.
135. See Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659,670 et seq.;
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1175-79 (1977); Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L. J. 1063 (1980). See also Fiss, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-15 (1979); Lynch, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 860-62
(1980).
136. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 670 et. seq. But
see Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695. Edwin
Baker and Kenneth Karst also derive quite substatitive views of equal protection from their (analogous to Ely's
concept of equal participation) concepts of equal respect (Baker) and equal citizenship (Karst). Baker, Neu-
trality, Process, and Rationality as Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029,
1030-31, 1043 (1980); Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1977).
The problem with views like Michelman's, Baker's, and Karst's views of democratic participation is to
identify the substantive issues that are left for the democratic process to resolve once one has awarded all sorts
of substantive rights-in the face of majority opposition-on the ground that these rights are necessary for
participating in the democratic process. Of course, all nonoptional views of equal protection must explain how
politics fits into the constitutional scheme, if at all. Views that purport to be optional ones, with major issues left
to democratic resolution, but that require all sorts of substantive rights as preconditions for true democracy, run
the great risk of becoming nonoptional views through the backdoor of their peculiar concept of democracy. If in
making political decisions, I can only respect the interests of persons who are well-fed, well-housed, well-
employed, and well-educated, what interests of theirs are left for me to respect in my decisionmaking once they
are well-fed, etc.?
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way. Baker argues that Ely's concept of democracy requires the legislature to
count everyone's preferences, which is what is meant by representation.'
3 7
Legislatures are generally good at counting preferences, but they cannot be
trusted to count the preferences of certain groups, for example, blacks. The
judiciary's role is to intervene in cases in which the likelihood is strong that
the legislature has not counted certain preferences (and will not, if not forced,
count them in the foreseeable future). The logical consequence of such inter-
vention is for the judiciary to order the legislature to implement those policies
that it would have implemented had it counted everyone's preference.
On Baker's version of Ely's theory, the theory is a "process" theory
because it is concerned with breakdowns in the legislative process of counting
preferences. It is nonsubstantive because the legislature is presumably sup-
posed to count everyone's preferences and not refuse to do so for, say, moral
reasons.1
38
I think it is clear, however, that if Baker's version of Ely is correct, then
Ely's theory is a substantive theory, not a process one, and it is, moreover, a
nonoptional substantive theory. As Baker portrays it, Ely's theory is that of
pure preference utilitarianism. 39 The legislature must count all preferences
and weigh them in the utilitarian calculus proportionate to their strength. (It
would be nonsensical to require the legislature to count all persons' prefer-
ences but to allow it to discount or inflate the weight of those preferences for
reasons other than the strength of the preferences.) Like Dworkin's theory of
equal protection,' 4° the theory that Baker links most closely to Ely's, Ely's
theory as portrayed by Baker is decidedly substantive, not procedural.
Moreover, under Ely t la Baker, the legislature has no true substantive
options. It must implement whatever policies are dictated by preference
utilitarianism. Presumably it could be replaced by a computer programmed
according to preference utilitarianism so long as there were no disagreements
over matters of fact. (The computer would be superior to a legislature with
respect to the problem of ignoring the preferences of certain groups.)
Such a strong substantive, nonoptional view of equal protection is dif-
ficult to reconcile with Ely's own view of his theory as one in which the
Constitution places the processes of democracy above substantive moral
137. See Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality as Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal Protection.
58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1036, 1039-41, 1045-48 (1980).
138. Baker expresses uncertainty over whether Ely. like Dworkin (R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY, 234-39, 275-78 (1977); Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 133-34 (S.
Hampshire ed. 1978)), would refuse to allow the legislature to count "external" preferences such as racist ones,
or whether he would demand that all preferences be counted. Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality as
Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1043, 1047-49 (1980). The uncertainty
can be traced to Ely's favorable citations to Dworkin's principle of equal concern and respect, ELY, supra note
1, at 82, 243 n. 10, a principle that Dworkin uses to purge the legislative process of external preferences, and
Ely's linking of that principle with his own concept of representation, id. at 82, all the time insisting that his
theory is a process one.
139. Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality as Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal Protection, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (1980). See also ELY, supra note I, at 187 n.14.
140. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 223-39 (1977).
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values. Indeed, in Baker's view, Ely's theory is 180 degrees from where Ely
believes it to be. I think it more plausible, as I have said, to assume that Ely
holds a very weak substantive position, one that allows almost all substantive
options but those resulting from racist (and sexist) meta-rules. That position is
not a pure process position, wholly free of substantive values. But it is surely
much closer to one than is the position attributed to Ely by Baker.
Interestingly, a decade ago Ely identified a proper, though limited, role
for concern with process in equal protection jurisprudence. 4' Whether equal
protection embodies one substantive moral theory or permits a choice among
substantive moral theories, those moral theories may identify certain in-
stances when a random procedure should be used for dispensing benefits and
burdens. 42 (Each theory would also identify what counts as random pro-
cedure; it might, for example, rule out using sexual groups as the groups
between which a random choice is made because of secondary effects due to
cultural factors, but not rule out groups defined by the alphabetical ranking of
surnames. 43) A permitted or required substantive moral theory may also
allow certain rules to be enacted on the basis of the legislators' aesthetic
judgments. A concern with process-namely, a concern with whether deci-
sions that could or should have been random or aesthetic were in fact random
or aesthetic-is warranted for those decisions, as Ely pointed out. If equal
protection allows optional moral theories, then a concern with process-with
discovering the moral theory actually employed (the meta-rule) and discover-
ing whether a mistake was made-is warranted for every decision. But even if
equal protection embodies only one moral theory and leaves no true options
for the government, if that theory dictates some random distributions and
aesthetic judgments, a concern with process will be necessary for those deci-
sions.
Unfortunately, Ely mistakenly assumed that his concern for process in
the sense of verifying claims of random selection and aesthetic judgment
could operate otherwise than within a substantive theory of equal protection.
Ely explicitly adopted a value-free mistake theory, although he tried to save it
from the absurdities that such a theory results in by artificially defining the
ends that particular types of laws must serve.'44 Not only did Ely take this
141. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
142. It might, for example, require that juries be selected, or voting district lines be drawn, through some
sort of random procedure. See id. at 1230-35; City of Mobile v. Bolden. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (esp. 83-94: Stevens.
J., concurring); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (male defendant may challenge intentional exclusion of
women from the jury); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (white defendant may challenge intentional exclusion
of blacks from the jury).
143. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Sher. What Makes a Lottery Fair?., 14 NOIS 203 (1980);
Note, The Equality ofAllocation by Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 113 (1977); Note, Equal Protection: A
Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. REV. 771, 861-68 (1978).
144. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1224-28
(1970). Thus, for example, traffic laws must serve the goal of safety. For criticism of Ely on this point, see P.
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 560-63 (1975); Note, Legislative Purpose, Ra-
tionality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 134 (1972).
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dubious tack, but he also removed the constraints his limitation placed on
possible ends by allowing legislatures to pursue "the umbrella goal of the
general welfare," 45 an end that would eliminate all means/ends misfit so long
as it were sincerely pursued. Because all decisionmakers probably believe
that they are pursuing the general welfare, Ely's mistake theory turned out to
be just as empty as other mistake theories. 46
Ely has changed his theory somewhat, but he is still caught between the
rock of a substantive theory or theories of equality and the hard place of an
empty mistake theory.
3. The "Tangling" of Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
Several commentators, including Ira Lupu and Michael Perry, have
lamented the fact that the Supreme Court keeps "tangling" equal protection
and due process analyses in its opinions, unnecessarily confusing the juris-
prudence of individual rights. 47 If my analysis of equal protection theories is
correct, however, then the Supreme Court's "tangling" of equal protection
and due process is quite understandable and perhaps inevitable.
First, if the Constitution embodies one moral theory, then unless that
theory has as many ultimate principles as there are constitutional provisions
that reflect the theory, some of those provisions will merge with others at the
most abstract level. 48 Thus, a Benthamite moral theory underlying the Con-
145. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1246-49
(1970).
146. See Alexander, Introduction. Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 935
(1978) (-[lit is probably almost impossible to find a racist whose ultimate justification for his acts is racial
oppression as an end in itself.-).
147. See Lupu. Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979);
Perry. Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1074-83
(1979). See also Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade. 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979).
148. If each individual rights provision stands for a paradigmatic set of cases that the Framers felt consti-
tuted governmental violations of individual rights, and if the same ultimate principle of the one moral theory
embodied in the Constitution can be violated in several different such paradigms (and hence under several
different provisions), then when that principle is violated, so that the Constittion is violated, it really matters
very little which provision the courts invoke. Thus, if -'discrete and insular minorities" are the particular
concern of equal protection, and property rights and autonomy are particular concerns of substantive due
process or privileges and immunities, but the same ultimate moral principle stands behind all the provisions and
determines their application. only intellectual neatness is at stake in calling a violation of the rights of minorities
a due process violation, or calling a restriction on autonomy an equal protection one. See text accompanying
note 44 supra. But see Schauer. Response: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. P1r". L. REV. 605,
611-13 (1979).
Michael Perry's attempt to effect a neat separation of the normative bases underlying equal protection and
due process, an attempt he makes in conjunction with his criticism of the Supreme Court's failure to disentangle
the two clauses, illustrates the difficulties with viewing moral principles other than as part of a unified theory.
Perry. Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLJIM. L. REV. 1023 (1979). Perry
believes equal protection is directed at classifications that are 'morally irrelevant," whereas due process is
directed at classifications that are "governmentally irrelevant.- He fails, however, to justify or even to render
coherent this distinction.
Perry begins with the rather uncontroversial contention that the Framers of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause were concerned to outlaw denials of specific rights to blacks because those denials
reflected the assertion of the moral inferiority of blacks. It is then an easy step to generalize from that original
concern to a concern with any discrimination reflecting an assertion of moral inferiority of particular races.
Because this concern with assertions of moral inferiority based on race is the product of a principle that race is a
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stitution would view each separate constitutional provision as a special lens,
organized around a paradigm of cases of moral concern, through which to
view the ultimate governing principle of utility maximization. A Rawlsian
moral theory would have two ultimate principles-the "equal liberty prin-
morally irrelevant trait. "assent [to the principle, no person is by virtue of race morally inferior to another,]
.. logically requires assent to the more general proposition that it is unjust to treat a person as morally inferior
to another by virtue of any morally irrelevant trait." Id. at 1051.
Perry defends the generalization beyond race to all morally irrelevant traits by pointing out that making
equal protection embody the principle of the moral irrelevance of race is itself a generalization from the more
specific concerns of the Framers.
What is of principal interest here is the notion of morally irrelevant traits. Perry asks "how the Court can
ascertain whether a particular trait or factor ought to be deemed morally irrelevant." and answers:
[W]e conventionally think it proper that the extent of the respect and concern that we accord another
person is a function of the extent to which we approve or disapprove that person's choices and
activities, his or her self-definition. More precisely, the principal reason for extending or withholding
respect or concern is to approve or disapprove, and thereby influence, choices and activities deemed
beneficial or harmful. These considerations suggest what the criterion of moral relevance should be. If
a trait or other factor indicates nothing about a person's choices or activites, and if further it indicates
nothing about the person's physical or mental capacity-in the form of native talent, acquired skills,
temperament, or the like-to make particular choices or engage in particular activities, that trait or
factor ought to be deemed morally irrelevant. That is, no person ought to be deemed, by virtue of such
a trait or factor, less deserving of respect, concern, opportunity for self-fulfillment, or more deserving
of subordination to or domination by others. Extending or withholding respect and concern on the
basis of-adopting an attitude of approval or disapproval toward-a morally irrelevant trait or factor
makes no sense, because the trait or factor is not an indicator, a proxy, for any particular choice,
activity, talent, or skill deemed beneficial or harmful.
Id. at 1065-66.
Now I want to pause to examine Perry's discussion of moral relevance in some detail, both because I find it
confusing, and because it is extremely important to Perry's thesis about the separation of equal protection and
due process. Perry begins by appearing to equate moral relevance to moral desert. Thus, he speaks of using
moral judgment to influence a person's choices or activities. Of course, we do ordinarily premise moral praise
and blame-our assessment of moral desert-on the choices a person makes. What a person has no choice about
is not an appropriate criterion of his moral desert.
But the problem is that moral relevance goes far beyond moral desert. After all, such diverse moral
philosophers as John Rawls (J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)) and Robert Nozick (R. NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE. AND UTOPIA (1974)) separate moral entitlement from moral desert. And Perry himself is
aware of the greater scope of moral relevance, for he does not deny that immutable traits-such as, for example,
"native talent"-that may be quite unrelated to moral desert, are morally relevant.
Once Perry extends moral relevance to immutable factors that do not relate to moral desert and that need
only be indicators, or proxies, for "any particular choice, activity, talent, or skill deemed beneficial or harm-
ful," then either he loses any coherent sense of moral relevance altogether, or else he must present a full-blown
normative theory as a background for assessing moral relevance. If race is the source of, say. aesthetic pleasure
or displeasure, then is it any different from, say, a native talent such as the ability to sing, play basketball, or
make widgets? It is not different with respect to its being "an indicator.., for any ... talent ... deemed
beneficial or harmful." That is, it is not different unless one has a full-blown normative theory that would
explain its difference, a fidl-blown normative theory that would justify and link both the values protected by
equal protection and the vahtes protected by due process.
When Perry turns to discuss homosexuality, and why it is not an illegitimate equalprotection classification.
but why it might be an illegitimate due process classification, he introduces a distinction between onoral
irrelevance-an equal protection flaw that does not attach to homosexuality-and governmnental irrelevance-a
due process flaw that does attach to abortion, contraception, ideology, and perhaps homosexuality. Now I do
not wish to deny Perry's point that there are some things that are morally relevant to private persons that should
not be grounds for governmental action. What I do wish to maintain, however, is that Perry's neat distinction
between factors that are morally irrelevant vel non (equal protection factors) and factors that are morally
relevant but forbidden for government to employ (due process factors) cannot be defended. First. moral
relevance always varies with the actor and the context. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that under a coherent
normative theory, some factors would be morally irrelevant to private actors in some situations and not others,
some factors would be morally irrelevant to government in some situations and not others, and some factors
would be morally relevant to private actors but morally irrelevant to government. (It is less plausible that there
would be factors that were morally irrelevant to private actors but morally relevant to government.) Eye-color
might be a morally defensible basis for a private actor's choosing a spouse but not for that actor's choosing
19811 A METATHEORETICAL TAXONOMY
ciple" and the "difference principle."' 49 A Nozickian moral theory would
have principles of acquisition, transfer, rectification, risk creation, and non-
appropriation of another's body, talents, and labor. 50 The lines between or
among ultimate principles within one moral theory may or may not conveni-
ently fit with the lines-drawn with reference to paradigm cases-between
and among the specific constitutional provision that reflect that theory.' 5'
If the Constitution leaves room for governmental choice between or
among ultimate moral theories--or if judicial deference or limitation create
the appearance of choice from the courts' perspective-then the line between
equal protection and due process might be drawn to correspond to the line
between optional and nonoptional benefits and burdens. If equal protection
whom to employ, and it might be totally irrelevant to government given what the background normative theory
describes as government's proper role. Or consider alienage, a factor that Perry deems morally relevant vel non.
Again. although alienage may indeed be relevant in some contexts, and those contexts may be the very ones
Perry identifies, alienage is surely not morally relevant in all contexts. Finally, if moral relevance transcends
moral desert and includes use as a proxy for some relevant factor, then race, sex, and illegitimacy will surely at
times be morally relevant to both private actors and to government, since they will surely at times be useful as
proxies. (Proxy "'talent" is surely as useful as other talents.) In short, it is hard to imagine factors that are,
regardless of actor or context, always morally relevant or irrelevant. Moral relevancy is highly contextual, and
few, if any, factors are morally relevant or irrelevant Lel non.
Second. it seems doubtful that the normative principles that rule abortion to be a matter of moral irrele-
vance to government are totally unconnected at some lerel with the principles that define the moral relevance, if
any. of abortion to private actors.
To summarize, moral relevance is not something that is independent of the context or the identity, public or
private, of the actor, especially if one concedes that morally relevant factors extend beyond desert bases to
include immutable characteristics such as native talents and so forth. And the normative theory that identifies
moral relevance in each context for private actors will be the same normative theory that identifies the proper
considerations for government. Put differently, the reasons why and when private actors may sometimes
morally properly consider eye-color, race. and the choice to abort in dealing with others will be intricately
connected with the reasons why. when, and how government can properly consider those factors. To assume
otherwise is to asume a radical division among normative considerations that has no theoretical basis.
149. J. RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302-03 (1971). Rawls' two principles of justice, derived from his
..general conception" of justice. id. at 303. have been widely discussed and criticized. The priority that Rawls
assigns to his first principle of justice (equal liberty) has come under particularly heavy attack. See, e.g., B.
BARRY. THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 34-43,59-82 (1973). Daniels. Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of
Liberty. in READING RAWLS 253 (N. Daniels ed. 1975); Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 534 (1973). Many actions of government might violate both of Rawls' principles simultaneously. Thus, if
Rawls* first principle were tied to what we normally think of as substantive due process concerns (speech,
religion, privacy. etc.). and his second principle were deemed to be the governing principle of equal protection,
there would still be many cases that involved both clauses, for instance, depriving someone of wealth because of
his political or religious activities. The neo-Rawlsian constitutional theorists-for example, Michelman, Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); D. RICHARDS,
THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 150-83 (1977); and see
Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113-43 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978)-will also no doubt
arrive at fewer ultimate moral principles than there are constitutional provisions through which to apply those
principles. Thus, they too will "'tangle" constitutional rights.
150. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). See also C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978)
(positive rights to fair shares of resources combined with negative rights protecting against intentional harm,
appropriation of one's body, talents, and labor, and unjustified risk creation).
151. Of course, the Framers might have had an ultimate theory in mind when they enacted various
provisions that they believed would best implement the theory in rule-consequentialist fashion. In such a case
the various provisions must be interpreted as formal rules, which may or may not be the correct rules for
implementing the theory. If they are the correct rules-if the Framers were right-the result is the same as if the
Court tried to implement the theory directly, since the Court would choose to do so in rule-consequentialist
fashion. If they are not the correct rules, then we have a question of whether proper interpretation requires
adhering to the rules or adhering to the underlying theory. See generally text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
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ruled out a specific set of effects, as Berger and Fiss would maintain, 52 it
would be easily enough distinguished from due process, though less satis-
factory normatively. If, as on my interpretation of Ely, 53 equal protection
ruled out a very limited set of meta-rules, such as those that are based on
racial or sexual superiority as ultimate moral principles, it would again be
easy enough to distinguish equal protection violations from due process ones,
though equal protection might have little role to play in contemporary so-
ciety. 54 But if equal protection allows a choice among a limited set of basic
moral positions and rules out what I have called nonparallel meta-rules be-
tween those polar positions, 5 5 disentangling equal protection from due process
will often be quite difficult. Disentangling will focus upon whether the defect
in the rule is that the rule makes someone worse off than he would be under
either polar position (below point X on Diagram C'56-due process), or
whether the defect is that the rule does not represent solely a compromise
between permissible moral positions (equal protection).
The entanglement problem can be most easily illustrated by focusing on
precisely those cases that the commentators claim are really due process
cases masquerading as equal protection ones. Take Shapiro v. Thompson'l57
both Lupu and Perry claim that in Shapiro the principal defect was an in-
fringement of the right to travel, a due process defect, through imposition of a
one-year residency requirement for eligiblity for welfare. But if welfare is a
constitutionally optional benefit-and if the one-year residency requirement
did not deter interstate migration more than complete elimination of welfare,
an action that the state was constitutionally entitled to take if welfare is
optional-the new residents were no worse off than they would have been
under a constitutionally permissible scheme. The true defect then was not a
due process one stemming from the effect on interstate travel, but rather an
equal protection one stemming from the new resident/old resident distinction
in the award of welfare benefits. That distinction is problematic to the extent
that it cannot be shown to represent a parallel meta-rule between the moral
theory that requires welfare and the moral theory that forbids welfare.
The same analysis can be made of Chicago v. Mosley, " a case that the
Court decided on equal protection, not first amendment, grounds. The Court
was justified in invoking equal protection if Chicago could, without violating
the first amendment, deny all demonstrators the right to picket near schools,
and if in addition denying all demonstrators except labor demonstrators that
right did not leave all other demonstrators worse off than had all demonstra-
152. See text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 131-33 supra.
154. 1 doubt that the major battles in the future over the justice of governmental actions will center on
claims of racial or sexual superiority.
155. See text accompanying Diagram G supra.
156. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
157. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for eligibility for welfare violates equal protection
because of effect on interstate migration).
158. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting all but labor union picketing near schools violates equal
protection because of lack of content-neutrality). See also Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm., 100 S.
Ct. 2326 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980).
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tions been banned. Upon such a hypothesis, the defect in the law was the
unjustified discrimination between classes of demonstrators, an equal protec-
tion defect. 159
Maher v. Roe, t'6 another case whose equal protection rather than due
process focus has been severely criticized, 6' also appears to have been cor-
rectly analyzed by the Court, though not necessarily correctly decided. There
was really no evidence that poor women seeking abortions were really worse
off-through deterrence or through drying up of private funds-than had the
states chosen the (arguably) permissible course of not redistributing wealth in
the form of health care. 62 Without such evidence, the only question would be
whether the governmental discrimination between those seeking abortions
and those choosing childbirth, apparently to encourage the latter choice and
discourage the former, was a valid discrimination in the award of an optional
benefit-an equal protection question regarding whether this rule was part of
a parallel compromise meta-rule.
Likewise, Douglas v. California163 and Griffin v. Illinois64 are properly
considered to be equal protection cases, though the principle they an-
nounce-equal benefit to rich and poor from procedures more protective than
those required by due process (optional procedures)-is extreme and has never
been taken by the Court to its logical conclusion. The benefits-free counsel
and transcripts-were constitutionally optional in that they were part of a
proceeding (an appeal) deemed constitutionally optional by the Court. There
was no showing that providing transcripts and counsel on appeal only to those
who could afford them made the indigent defendants worse off than had no
appeals been allowed anyone.' 65
159. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1967); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). for instances
in which the Court struck down unequal burdens placed on members of various political and religious groups on
first amendment, not equal protection, grounds, despite the apparent optionality of the benefits in question and
the difficulty of showing that the burdens were more severe than any permissible meta-rule would allow. (Of
course, Ms. Sherbert in fact may have been worse off than under any permissible meta-rule if she had con-
tributed to the unemployment fund.) Cases like Sherbert suggest that there is a first amendment mode in equal
protection law, one properly invoked whenever a compromise meta-rule is nonparallel due to religious or
ideological bias. Tangling of freedom of religion and speech with equal protection is thus to be expected, though
the "tangling" religious clause logically should be the establishment clause.
160. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (medical welfare need not be provided to enable women to obtain abortions
despite its being provided for the costs of live birth). See also Harris v. McRae. 100 S. Ct. 2701 (1980) (Brennan,
I.. dissenting).
161. See Lupu. Untangling the Strands ofthe Fourteenth Amendnent, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981. 1003-11
(1979); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1076
(1979).
162. Situations in which the government subsidizes an ideological position with optional benefits may in
many cases actually make the proponents of the alternative position worse off than had no subsidy been given at
all. That effect can occur because the prestige of the government is thrown on one side of the balance, and
private resources are withdrawn from the other. See note 57 supra.
163. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (equal protection violated by not providing indigent criminal defendant with
counsel on first appeal).
164. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (equal protection violated by not providing indigent criminal defendant with free
trial transcript for his appeal).
165. One problem in Douglas and Griffin-a problem not mentioned by the Court and thus not relevant to
the Court's conclusion-was that taxpayers did pay for part of the costs of the appeals, namely, the costs
associated with the judges' salaries, the courtroom, and so forth. A taxpayer's subsidy for a procedure utilizable
only by wealthy defendants is problematic.
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Unlike Shapiro, Mosley, Maher, Griffin, and Douglas, which arguably
are equal protection cases, Zablocki v. Redhail' 66 and Eisenstadt v. Baird'67
are good examples of due process cases that were erroneously treated as
equal protection ones. 168 In Zablocki, the complaint was not that the right to
marry could be restricted by a financial test so long as the test somehow
burdened all equally, or burdened all with similar premarital encumbrances
equally. The complaint was that the right to marry could not be burdened by
such a financial test irrespective of how others were burdened. Financial
requirements of the type Wisconsin had imposed were not optional burdens
that could pass muster under one permissible meta-rule, but were instead
nonoptional burdens that could not be imposed under any permissible meta-
rule. The same analysis holds for the burden placed on single persons in
Eisenstadt with respect to the purchase of contraceptives.
Of course, in cases like Zablocki and Eisenstadt, once it is established
that the absolute burden violates due process, the comparative burden is also
established to be unjustified. But this comparative injustice-an apparent
equal protection violation-is parasitic on establishing a noncomparative in-
justice-a due process violation-and adds nothing to the analysis. Every
violation of due process can be viewed as an equal protection violation in the
sense that every due process violation burdens some (unjustifiably) more than
it burdens others. Equal protection and due process cannot be distinguished
on grounds of unjustifiable unequal burdens.
The analysis in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections69 is a due process
analysis if one views the case as an instance when extending the right to vote
to some but not all rendered those without the vote worse off than had no one
been given the vote, and when it was permissible to extend the vote to no
one.' 70 However, it is unlikely, given the guaranty clause,' 7' that Virginia
would have been able to eliminate all voting, at least for state offices.
Finally, the separate-but-equal race cases illustrate the difficulty of
disentangling equal protection from due process if one looks only at the fact
that a racial classification is being employed and not at the status of the
benefit being allocated (constitutionally optional or nonoptional). Some sepa-
rate-but-equal cases involved benefits that have been traditionally treated as
constitutionally optional-public schools,'72 public parks,' 73 public golf
166. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (financial burden placed on poor parents as a condition of right to remarry violates
equal protection).
167. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (restrictions on single persons' access to contraceptives violates equal protection).
168. See Lupu. Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981. 1023-26
(1979).
169. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (equal protection violated by imposition of poll tax).
170. Of course, one still has to examine the (objective) reasons behind the exclusion to see if the claim of a
denial of due process is in fact justified; because those without the franchise are worse off than had no one been
given the franchise does not mean necessarily that they are worse off than they could have been under a
permissible meta-rule.
171. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every State... a Republican Form
of Government .... "
172. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
173. Watson v. City of Memphis. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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courses;'74 others involved benefits that are thought of as nonoptional, natural
liberties-access to public beaches,'75 the right to purchase real property,
76
access to private facilities, 77 or the right to choose one's spouse. 78 The
former cases could be viewed as cases of invalid compromise meta-rules
(equal protection violations), or as cases in which provision of the optional
benefit on the basis of race left some worse off than under any permissible
meta-rule (due process). The latter cases involved straight due process
claims. The unjustified inequality between, say, the intraracial couple that
was allowed to marry and the interracial couple that was prevented from
marrying was secondary in consideration to the unjustified absolute burden
placed on the latter couple. In other words, had Virginia's law in Loving in
fact prevented everyone in Virginia from marrying the person of his or her
choice and had burdened everyone precisely equally, even taking into ac-
count secondary effects of racial classifications and the varying strength of
desires to marry a particular person, the gravamen of the complaint would
have remained. Tangling of equal protection and due process claims is there-
fore attributable to one of two possible causes: either the Court perceives the
Constitution as embodying one moral theory that can be invoked under either
equal protection or due process, in which case the choice of clause is irrele-
vant; 79 or the Court perceives some benefits to be optional, some to be
nonoptional, but can separate those benefits and analyze the impact of laws
on them only by being very explicit about the moral theories forbidden and
permitted, which the Court has failed to be.
4. Judicial Perspectives on Governmental Acts
The discussion of equal protection methodology thus far has been rele-
vant to any governmental decisionmaker, for it has focused on the meaning of
equal protection, a meaning that all governmental actors must follow. How-
ever, much of what we think of as equal protection methodology-the stock
phrases employed by courts and commentators-really has less to do with the
meaning of equal protection than it does with whether a governmental rule
should be presumed by a court to be constitutional or unconstitutional, and
how that presumption should be rebutted. In other words, the stock phrases
of equal protection refer to evidentiary factors for courts, not primarily to
factors with which other governmental decisionmakers should be concerned.
174. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955). affd, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); New Orleans City
Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958). affd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
175. Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955). affd, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (public beaches, though additional facilities also involved).
176. Harmon v. Tyler. 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
177. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1%2); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (18%).
178. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967).
179. This explanation is strongly suggested by the Court's kinky fifth amendment 'equal protection"
jurisprudence. See Alexander & Horton, Ingraham v. Wright: A Primer for Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1373 n.249 (1979), for some of the cases in that line.
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a. Types of Judicial Scrutiny: Strict, Intermediate, and Minimal
The courts' proper functions with respect to claims of equal protection
violation are, under the nonoptional view of equal protection, to ascertain
whether the governmental rule is consistent with the mandated moral theory,
and, under the optional view of equal protection, to ascertain both whether
the governmental rule is consistent with a permissible meta-rule in its effects
and whether a permissible meta-rule was in fact intended. Full-scale, search-
ing, judicial scrutiny in every case would be a misuse of judicial resources,
however, even if it would minimize the total number of equal protection
violations, because the resources expended would exceed the benefits
gained. 180 Therefore, the courts should vary the searchingness of their review
of governmental rules for impermissible effects or meta-rules according to the
likelihood of discovering a violation and the seriousness of the suspected
violation. The three commonly identified types of judicial review-strict,
intermediate, and minimal-that probably describe ranges on a continuum of
types of judicial review rather than three distinct points on such a continuum,
can be viewed as responses to the varying likelihood and seriousness of
unconstitutionality of different types of governmental rules-types defined by
factors such as the nature of the classification employed or the interest af-
fected. Thus, when a court employs minimal scrutiny of a business regula-
tion and upholds an equal protection attack on it, the court has not said the
regulation is constitutional. It has said only that there is not a sufficient
probability of an improper meta-rule or serious improper effects to warrant a
more searching judicial inquiry. Primary decisionmakers-legislators and ad-
ministrators-have no different constitutional obligation in the area of mini-
mal scrutiny from their obligation in the area of strict scrutiny. Standards of
scrutiny are procedural standards for courts, not substantive standards for
primary decisionmakers.
18
b. Triggers of the Varying Forms of Scrutiny:
Suspect Classifications and Fundamental Interests
(I) Suspect Classifications
Traditionally, the nature of the classification employed in a rule has been
the most important determinant of the form of judicial scrutiny invoked in
180. To say this is not to commit oneself to a utilitarian analysis of the allocation ofjudicial resources. A
Rawlsian cost-benefit calculus can be constructed. And even a Nozickian must have a cost-benefit approach to
the question of what expenditures should be made on procedures. See Alexander. Cutting the Gordian Knot:
State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893, 919-21 n.69 (1975); L. ALEXANDER,
MODERN LIBERTARIAN THEORY. See also O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of
Equal Protection. 54 N.Y. U.L. REV. 19, 43 (1979); Perry. Constitutional -Fairness-: Notes on Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process. 63 VA. L. REV. 383, 398-99 n.71 (1977).
181. Even if the standards operate as formal, judicially constructed rules determining what is constitutional
and unconstitutional, see text accompanying notes 208-10 infra. rather than as judicial presumptions ofconstitu-
tionality or unconstitutionality, the primary decisionmaker would still have a constitutional obligation beyond
the judicial rule if the judicial rule permitted a course of action because of the costs ofjudicial intervention and
not because the ultimate moral principles permit it.
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response. Major controversy has centered on the questions of which classifi-
cations should trigger strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and minimal
scrutiny, and whether a particular kind of classification should trigger the
same degree of scrutiny in all cases.
According to my analysis of equal protection, a type of classification can
be relevant to the type of judicial scrutiny required in the following ways:
(1) Some classifications, given both the historical context and the type of
law in question, strongly suggest that the decisionmaker was not pursuing the
required meta-rule (nonoptional view) or a permissible meta-rule (optional
view). (Although motive is immaterial on the nonoptional view, it is nonethe-
less probative of material effects.'82) Suspectness of classification in this sense
is both a matter of degree and highly contextual, and the strictness of judicial
scrutiny occasioned would accordingly be a matter of degree and highly con-
textual. 83 The various factors often mentioned as determinants of suspect
classifications-Ely's we-they test, political powerlessness,'" 4 historical
182. See text accompanying note 1% infra.
183. Thus. an intermediate level of suspectness should provoke an intermediate degree of strictness of
judicial review. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-97 (1978), for a discussion of inter-
mediate review, its triggers and its components. One component-that the currently articulated governmental
purpose for the rule actually be the purpose behind retaining the rule-does not fit my analysis of equal
protection methodology. Under the nonoptional view, where effects are all that matter. government's actual
purpose is only probative of effects, and a currently articulated purpose may be even more probative than the
actual purpose. Under the optional view, we always are looking for the actual meta-rule (actual purpose) behind
the rule as well as the rule's effects under any standard of judicial review.
Disproportionate impact upon groups whose distinguishing characteristics would render suspect any classi-
fications that expressly employed those characteristics should provoke levels of scrutiny that vary according to
the degree of disproportion and the rule's historical and subject-matter context. Treating disproportionate
impact on certain groups as alna)ys requiring strict judicial scrutiny or as always requiring minimal scrutiny is
even less defensible than treating explicit references to those groups as always suspect or as always nonsuspect,
which itself is indefensible. Treating disproportionate impact on races, for example, as a trigger for minimal
scrutiny. while treating a racial classification in similar circumstances as a trigger for strict scrutiny, places far
too great a burden on characterizing a classification (e.g., skin color) as racial as opposed to nonracial with a
disproportionate racial impact. Is a skin-color classification "'racial?" Is a sex-specific classification (e.g.,
pregnancy) "sexual?" Why should it matter? The probability of an improper meta-rule varies according to the
type of classification, but it does not vary in quantum leaps according to whether a classification is. say, racial as
opposed to nonracial with a disproportionate impact.
(This analysis also suggests the impropriety of a two-step inquiry in disproportionate impact cases:
(I) proving a covert suspect classification, then (2) requiring a compelling governmental interest to demonstrate
that the suspect classification was not employed in pursuance of an improper meta-rule. The proper inquiry is a
unitary one directed at ascertaining the actual meta-rule and the actual effects.)
A comment about the disproportionate racial impact equal protection theories of Ted Eisenberg and
Michael Perry is in order. See Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication. 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36 (1977); Perry. The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discritnina-
tion, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). Although both the mechanics and the normative underpinnings of Eisen-
berg's and Perry's theories are vague. I see only three coherent possibilities for the role of disproportionate
racial impact in equal protection law. Disproportionate racial impact may be a proscribed effect in itself. That is
Fiss' theory. See text accompanying note 82-85 supra. Disproportionate racial impact may be evidence of an
improper meta-rule because of what it suggests about motives. Or disproportionate racial impact may be
evidence of an improper meta-rule because of its usual effects. See Boyd. Purpose and Effect in the Law of Race
Discrimination: A Response to Washington v. Davis. 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 707, 723. 728 (1980).
184. The legislative employment of improper meta-rules is often the result, not of the legislators' nor the
electorate's beliefs about moral worth, but of political threats from economically powerful interests. Indeed, the
Carolene Products case itself, source of the famous footnote 4 (304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)), may be a
perfect example of a situation where legislation unjustifiable under any permissible meta-rule was passed
because of the political muscle of an economically powerful interest (the milk lobby) and the political powerless-
ness of the opposing economic interests. See B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980). See also S. GABIN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT TEST 77 (1980).
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prejudice, immutability, and so forth-would all be considered in determining
whether the classification in question, in the context of the type of rule in
question, strongly suggests an improper meta-rule.' 85
(2) Some classifications, merely by virtue of being used in a rule, gener-
ally have such major negative effects, that use of the classifications suggests
that, however permissible the meta-rule being followed, it is unlikely that the
effects will be those required by the meta-rule. For instance, because of
historical racism and sexism that cause even innocent racial and sexual classi-
fications to arouse suspicions; because people identify with others of their
racial and sexual groups and suffer psychic harm when they or other members
of their groups are harmed because of group membership; and because even
an otherwise legitimate use of a racial or sexual classification may engender
illegitimate uses by others, a racial or sexual classification by government
may have secondary negative effects that offset its otherwise beneficial ef-
fects in terms of producing the state of affairs mandated by a permissible
meta-rule. 186
Of course, these two ways in which classifications are relevant to judicial
scrutiny are related. Motives are best proved by effects, and effects are often
predicted by reference to motives. 187 But these two ways in which classifica-
tions are relevant are also distinct in that while the primary decisionmaker
must, like the courts, be concerned with the negative secondary effects of
otherwise useful classifications, the primary decisionmaker's relation to his
own motives-his meta-rule-is, unlike the courts', not a matter of presump-
tion, but one of first-hand knowledge.
(2) Fundamental Interests
There is a good deal of confusion over the role of so-called "fundamental
interests" in equal protection methodology, primarily because "fundamental
185. Employment of classifications that, to be justified, presuppose legislative findings of very specific.
"adjudicative" facts, strongly suggests an improper meta-rule reflecting unjustified hostility to the burdened
group. See Alexander & Horton, Ingraham v. Wright: A Primer for Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence. 52 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1362 n.211 (1979). Likewise, employment of classifications that result in disproportionate
impact on groups whose defining characteristics would render classifications based thereon suspect is often
suspect itself. See note 183 supra.
186. Many of the separate-but-equal cases might be best explained as instances when racial classifications
themselves produced negative effects rather than as instances of legislatures' following impermissible meta-
rules. See Boyd. Purpose and Effect in the Law of Race Discriniation:A Response to Washington v. Davis, 57
U. DET. J. URB. L. 707. 718-19. 723 (1980). Certain factors, such as the likelihood of an inaccurate stereotype's
infecting the legislative process, should lead to stricter scrutiny because of the increased likelihood that the
rule's actual effects will not fit with the required or permitted meta-rules. Likewise, rules whose correlation with
positive effects is based upon a prediction of how most people in a certain group will choose to act--"guilt by
association" rules-may have such negative psychic effects on members of the burdened group (and sometimes
the benefited group, in the case of gender classification), especially those individuals about whom the prediction
is incorrect, and may have such negative effects in terms of freezing cultural roles, that the positive effects
should be presumed outweighed on the balance represented by the moral theory-even if the prediction is highly
accurate and the rule highly efficient. See Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-I 1 (1976); Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
187. See text accompanying note 196 infra. See also Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitu-
tionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 939-40 (1978).
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interests" suggest due process concerns rather than equal protection ones.
My analysis of equal protection methodology should clarify the role-or
rather the roles-of fundamental interests.
First, under the nonoptional view of equal protection, in which one moral
theory is mandated, fundamental interests would be those interests identified
by the theory as so central that restriction on pursuit of those interests,
and/or unequal distribution of those interests, are primafacie, though perhaps
not conclusively, violative of the theory's mandates. The courts would
strictly scrutinize restrictions on and unequal allocations of those interests to
determine whether the violation is real or only apparent.
Second, under the optional view of equal protection, due process funda-
mental interests would be interests that all permissible meta-rules would
identify as important interests. In other words, due process fundamental
interests under an optional view of equal protection are interests located in
the nonoptional zone, the zone in which all permissible meta-rules overlap
and require or forbid the same rules. Direct restriction on due process (non-
optional) fundamental interests are prima facie violative of all permissible
meta-rules. In addition, allocating optional benefits in a manner that might pe-
nalize exercise of the due process (nonoptional) fundamental interests should
provoke the same response from both primary decisionmakers and courts as
does a direct penalty on the exercise of a due process fundamental interest.1
88
Third, under the optional view of equal protection, there are true equal
protection "fundamental interests." They are optional in that under one
permissible meta-rule they need not be allocated to anyone. However, they
may be so vital under the other permissible meta-rule that their unequal
allocation189 strongly suggests a nonparallel, improper meta-rule. Public edu-
cation, at least on the primary level, and welfare for subsistence',9 and health
are interests whose allocation other than on the basis of equal benefits for
equal needs strongly suggests something other than a compromise between,
say, Rawls and Nozick.'9 ' Alternatively, these equal protection "fundamental
interests" may be "fundamental" because of their highly competitive nature;
their unequal provision may make one worse off than had there been no
allocation at all, a due process violation.'9 2
188. See text accompanying note 157 supra.
189. Or. rather, the degree of inequality in their allocation times their importance.
190. But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Dandridge is quite inconsistent in flavor if not
holding with cases like U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973): U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v.
Murry. 413 U.S. 508 (1973); and Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
191. Of course, sometimes deviation from equal benefits for equal needs is to the absolute advantage of
those who are comparatively disadvantaged and thus is a Rawlsian deviation. The educationally neediest, for
example. may benefit more from expenditures on the most talented students than from expenditures directly for
their benefit because of trickle-down effects. The same may be true of public expenditures to preserve the
perfect health of one who is working on a cancer cure. Ordinarily, however, spending health or education
welfare on the more advantaged of the sick or uneducated cannot be justified on Rawlsian grounds, i.e., as a
valid Rawlsian-Nozickian compromise. This analysis should, by the way, provide a framework for viewing the
dispute over whether equal protection requires equal inputs or equal outputs in public education.
192. See note 162 supra. See also Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 925, 940-41 n.54 (1978).
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(3) Motives and Effects
There has been tremendous confusion over the roles of motives and
effects in equal protection jurisprudence, part of which has been occasioned
by the Supreme Court's doctrinal vacillations, 93 part of which has been oc-
casioned by the peculiar procedural nature of certain interests,' 94 and part of
which has been occasioned by an inadequate theoretical framework.
Under a nonoptional view of equal protection, the decisionmaker's
motive does not affect the inherent constitutionality of his rule (except when
he is mandated to use a random procedure or to make an aesthetic judg-
ment 95). Effects are generally all that matter. However, the decisionmaker's
ultimate motive-his meta-rule-and his intermediate motives can be proba-
tive of the effects of his rule to the extent those effects are uncertain from the
judicial perspective. Thus, when it is debatable whether the effects of a rule
will be those required by the one moral theory underlying the Constitution,
whether the decisionmaker was trying to comply with that theory and whether
he was acting on mistaken assumptions are relevant to predicting what effects
the law will actually have. 96
Under an optional view of equal protection, ultimate motives-meta-
rules-are directly at issue, and so too are effects. The meta-rule must be a
permissible one (or a permissible compromise), but the effects of the law must
also be consistent with a permissible (or compromise) meta-rule.' 97
Intermediate motives and mental states are not determinants of constitu-
tionality. However, they are probative of both ultimate motives and effects.
So too are other factors that concern the process by which the challenged
decision was arrived at-for example, the type of governmental institution
that rendered the decision (a legislature with general legislative authority
versus an administrative body with specialized authority'93 versus a referen-
dum' 99) and the type of evidence used and procedure followed by the institu-
tion .2
193. Compare Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), with Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971); and United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
194. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (districting); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)
(jury selection); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (same).
195. See text accompanying notes 141-43 supra.
196. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925,930-31,
934 (1978).
197. See text accompanying notes 89-102 supra.
198. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1137-46 (1978).
199. See Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1411-18 (1978).
200. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 934
(1978); Alexander & Horton, Ingraham v. Wright: A Priouerfor Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, 32 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1305, 1354-58 (1979); Sandalow. Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1184-90 (1977).
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(4) Means/Ends Fit
Government must, under the nonoptional view of equal protection, act to
produce the required effects-the effects that "fit" with the underlying moral
theory. Under the optional view, government must produce effects that "fit"
with a permissible moral theory. Under either view the only "fit" or "misfit"
that is constitutionally relevant is "fit" at the level of generality at which the
theory is stated. Thus, the effects that "fit" with Rawls are those effects that
can be redescribed as "maximizing the position of the least advantaged."
When the governmental "ends" in terms of which the "fit" of laws is
gauged are described at a level more specific than the level at which the
ultimate moral justification must be expressed-when, for instance, the end in
terms of which a genetic screening law's "fit" is gauged is described as
"health," or, more specifically, "genetic health," rather than as "the precise
mix of health and other ends necessary to maximize the position of the least
advantaged' '-proof of fit does not prove the law is constitutional, and proof
of misfit does not prove the law is unconstitutional. However, when minimal
judicial scrutiny is warranted, a court may decide-once it takes a glance at
the effects of the rule in question and sees that the rule is somewhat related to
a legitimate end, defined at a level intermediate between the specific language
of the rule and the ultimate moral theory2°'-that the likelihood of constitu-
tionality is so high that it is not worthwhile to investigate further the effects of
the rule. It may decide, that is, that given the initial high probability of con-
stitutionality, a showing of some fit with a relatively specifically defined legiti-
mate end warrants a judgment that the probability is now higher that the rule
fits perfectly with that mix of relatively specific legitimate ends that is re-
quired by the relevant moral theory. When stricter scrutiny is warranted
because the initial probability of constitutionality is lower, the court may
define the ends of the governmental rules at a higher level of generality-a
level nearer to that on which the moral theory is expressed-and also require
a more substantial relation or even a necessary one between the rules and the
ends. 02
One note that should be added at this point in the discussion is that the
various standards of judicial scrutiny are standards that are responses to how
201. The only truly legitimate end is. of course, the implementation of the permissible or required moral
theory. Any other ultimate end is illegitimate. More specific ends may be described as "legitimate." however, if
they are recognized as "'goods" under the theory-generally required by the theory-and illegitimate if they are
recognized as "'bads.'" For discussion of the level of generality at which ends are defined in order to test "fit"
under the various forms of scrutiny, see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
565-66 (1975); Note, Legislative Purpose. Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128-32 (1972).
202. The "less restrictive alternative" approach is just another way of describing the necessary relation
approach. However formulated, the approach is manipulable because it is tied to how specifically the ends are
defined in terms of which necessity or less restrictive alternatives are gauged. Again, strictly speaking, any law
to be constitutional must be necessary to serve those ends identified at the level of generality at which the
relevant moral theory is expressed. Any law for which there is truly a less restrictive alternative is unconstitu-
tional, for an alternative that is more restrictive in terms of a moral theory than is necessary for implementing
that moral theory must perforce violate that theory.
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the average court or judge should view the initial probability of constitution-
ality of particular types of governmental rules. A particular court or judge,
however, may not be average in that the court or judge may have more
expertise in an area than is normal. That fact will mean that a rule that would
normally justify only minimal judicial scrutiny may provoke-and perhaps
justify-more searching judicial scrutiny when the court has some expertise
concerning either the likely motives behind the rule or the rule's likely effects.
For example, a rule regulating train length, ostensibly for safety purposes, or
a rule regulating opticians, may be a kind of rule-so-called economic or
social legislation-that normally should receive little judicial investigation
because the likelihood of impermissible motives and effects is too low to
warrant legislative second-guessing by the average, inexpert court. But if the
reviewing judge herself believes that she is expert in the motive of the legisla-
ture that passed that rule or in the effects that rule will have, she will find it
psychologically difficult if not impossible to indulge in the same presumption
of constitutionality as the average judge. If she is an expert, perhaps that
presumption should be lower for her.
Standards of judicial scrutiny are thus not only ranges on a continuum;
they are also unstable and vary, perhaps justifiably, according to the assumed
and real expertise of the court in question. The tactical lesson here for the
advocate attacking a governmental rule that is normally accorded a heavy
presumption of constitutionality and minimal judicial scrutiny is to try every
means possible to get the court to look at her proof of the rule's mischievous
and irrational effects and the dubious motives behind its enactment. Once the
court peeks and feels itself to have been educated, it may decide the rule is
irrational or the result of improper motives. In such a case the court will never
be able psychologically to give the rule the same presumption of constitu-
tionality that it did initially, although the court still might decide that it should
not trust its judgment in cases of that type and should trust the legislative
judgment.
(5) Compellingness of Governmental Ends
The compellingness of the legitimate ends that a government rule serves
is also a frequently invoked ingredient in the methodology ofjudicial scrutiny.
Sometimes those ends must be only "legitimate." Sometimes those ends
must be "important." At other times those ends must be "compelling."
The compellingness of those governmental ends that the court can per-
ceive are effected by the rule in question is a relevant factor under the analy-
sis I have given. The reasons that the compellingness of governmental ends is
relevant are: (1) The suspicion of an improper meta-rule that is raised by
factors like suspect classifications is allayed by showing that the factors are
necessary to serve an important or compelling end; and (2) the negative ef-
fects that can be expected with a particular type of rule can also be expected
to be a worthwhile price given that the rule in question serves an important or
compelling end. The notion of importance and compellingness that make
importance and compellingness relevant here is derived from the permissible
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or mandatory moral theory. That is, an end is important if its achievement is
usually required by the theory, and it is compelling if its achievement is
almost always required by the theory.
(6) Standing
Resolving who has standing to raise an equal protection challenge is a
function of the moral theory or theories that are embodied in the clause and
that function as the justificatory background. 203 The standing questions thus
are: Who under the relevant moral theory has the primary right20 4 that is
correlative to the duty that the theory imposes on government (who might be
able to waive the government's duty)?; and, who has a right that is derived
from the person with the primary right? 2 5 Standing questions might be very
difficult under the nonoptional view of equal protection, depending upon the
moral theory chosen. Under the optional view, standing questions could be
doubly difficult because each of the permissible moral theories that is violated
might designate a different group of persons as the ones whose rights have
been infringed.
(In the case of nonparallel compromise meta-rules, it appears that mere
inequality of treatment will have to be sufficient to grant anyone who is
comparatively disadvantaged standing so long as that person is one whose
acquiescence in the inequality would cut off claims of anyone else.2"6 For
example, if Gordon builds a lavish pool for Wilbur and a small pool for Betty
because he believes women have inferior moral worth, and the result is that
Wilbur's out-of-town girlfriend is benefited, and Betty's out-of-town boy-
friend is harmed, does Betty's boyfriend have standing?20 7 On the one hand, a
203. 1 thus take as correct the view of standing so ably presented by Lee Albert. Albert, Justiciability and
Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1144-54 (1978); Albert, Standing
to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L. J. 425 (1974).
204. 1 use the term "right- here with full appreciation of the philosophical controversy over its proper use.
(For example, must 'rights- be waivable by their possessors, or may infants and animals also have "rights"
properly so called? And within act-utilitarianism or act-egalitarianism, is there anything other than one basic,
nonwaivable 'nght.'" possessed by everyone, that all others comply with the one basic moral duty to act so as
to produce maximum aggregate utility or maximum equal utility? And can any consequentialist justification-
rule or act-fully account for the way rights figure in moral discourse?)
205. See Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190, 192-97 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff. 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Eisenstadt v.
Baird. 405 U.S. 438. 443-46 (1972); Barrows v. Jackson. 346 U.S. 249, 254-60 (1953); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
206. See, e.g., On' v. On'. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). Mr. On was given standing to challenge the preference for
women in awarding alimony, even though under the permissible meta-rule most likely to be selected by
Alabama-alimony based on need-non-needy males like Mr. On' would be no better off. Standing makes sense
so long as a regime of "no alimony regardless of need." under which Mr. On would benefit, is consistent with a
permissible meta-rule. On the other hand, the owner of the store with which Mr. Orr trades would not have
standing, even though she might be harmed by the alimony award against Mr. On. See also Carey v. Brown, 100
S. Ct. 2286. 2303-05 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
207. Or suppose the challenge in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). to the test required for
policemen in Washington. D.C.-which test was failed by blacks in disproportionately high numbers-had been
brought by a white who failed the test on the ground that the test was adopted out of hostility towards blacks. Or
suppose that the admission procedure in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). reflected
hostility toward a sub-group of whites, a sub-group of which Bakke himself was not a member, and permissible
meta-rules would either treat that sub-group but not Bakke's sub-group preferentially or treat no group prefer-
entially.
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parallel meta-rule might improve the lot of Betty's boyfriend if Betty's pool
were raised to Wilbur's standards and not the reverse. On the other hand,
Betty might not want equal treatment, or might grow tired of her boyfriend; in
either case, the boyfriend would have no claim to the better pool. The better
result would be to deny him standing.)
(7) Formal Judicial Rules Developed Under a Nonformal View
of Equal Protection
As I mentiond earlier,08 even if equal protection or other constitutional
provisions embody nonformal moral principles, those principles might be best
implemented through the development of formal rules by the judiciary as well
as by the legislature. The rules would not produce exactly the same results in
individual cases as would be produced by an omniscient decisionmaker fol-
lowing the nonformal principles; but the rules would produce results closer to
those of the omniscient decisionmaker than ,would the nonformal principles
themselves in the hands of fallible legislators, administrators, and judges.
Their formality-their rigid, mechanical, opaque quality-could render them
easy to use, and their use easy to predict and to monitor, unlike the nonformal
principles.209
If the Supreme Court employed its current three-tiered scrutiny somewhat
more mechanically and thus made its equal protection decisions more predic-
table, the three-tiered scrutiny might pass for three formal rules of equal
protection. If, for example, suspect and semi-suspect classifications, funda-
mental interests, compelling and important governmental interests, and
necessary and substantial fit could all be defined in a mechanical fashion, so
that their application did not require recourse to the ultimate moral principles
and all the facts to which those principles would be sensitive, they might be
aspects of justifiable formal rules under some plausible moral theory. Or the
Court, perhaps with the aid of Congress, might develop more than three
"rules" of equal protection. Perhaps, too, some types of governmental actions
would not fall under any of the equal protection "rules" and would require
recourse to the equal protection "principles."
In any event, the Court's present equal protection jurisprudence is not
rule-like and cannot be justified, as formal rules can be justified, in terms of
predictability and ease of application. 2'0 At the same time, neither does the
Court's present equal protection approach directly employ an expressly
identified ultimate moral theory or theories case by case.
208. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
209. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 277 (1977); Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fun-
damental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 976, 983 (1978); Dworkin, Liberalism, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 134-35 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978); Dworkin, Social Sciences and Consti-
tutional Rights, 6 J. LAW & EDUC. 3, 10-12 (1977); O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case
of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 19, 44-50 (1979). See also P. BREST. PROCESSES OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DECISIONMAKING 488-89 (1975).
210. For discussion of per se rules in constitutional law, see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 994-1003, 1077-79 (1975).
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5. In Retrospect: Three Myths About Equal Protection Dispelled
Development of a coherent equal protection methodology has been ham-
pered by three myths that the above analysis should put to rest.
The first equal protection myth is that, while due process requires sub-
stantive evaluations of governmental rules, equal protection is a purely pro-
cedural limitation. The process theories of equal protection, however, either
turn out to be empty and pointless requirements that government not make
mistakes in matching its means to its ends, whatever those ends might be, or
else they turn out to be substantive theories at bottom.
The second equal protection myth is that the substantive values behind
equal protection are independent of the substantive values behind other con-
stitutional provisions. However, although equal protection theories can be
constructed around values that are unrelated to other constitutional values
because they are not related to a set of ultimate values from which all consti-
tutional values flow, such theories are normatively unsatisfactory. For that
reason, they are less plausible in terms of proper standards of interpretation
and judicial review.
The third equal protection myth is that the judgments of comparative
justice for which eqtial protection calls are somehow easier to make than the
judgments of noncomparative justice called for by other provisions. 2 " But the
comparative judgments-what are the relevant similarities and differences
between classes affected by the law, and what similarity or difference of
treatment do they justify-in fact assume a system of noncomparative justice
as a background, which system is sufficient as well as necessary for the
comparative judgments.-" Of course, there could be a concept of equality that
lies at the core of the noncomparative system itself, as is true of the moral
theories of Dworkin,2 3 Rawls,1 4 Bentham,2 5 and even Nozick.1 6 But that
concept of equality would itself merge comparative, equal protection judg-
ments with noncomparative, due process ones. It would surely not render
comparative judgments easier than noncomparative ones.
21 I. The classic statement reflecting this myth is Justice Jackson's in Railway Express Agency v. New
York. 336 U.S. 106. 112 (1949) (Jackson. J.. concurring):
Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable
conduct which many people find objectionable.
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does not disable any governmental
body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must
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had in making that scope narrower. Justice Jackson must be taken here to mean that the judgments of arbitrari-
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judgments of arbitrariness that invoke due process. See also Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality as
Flawed Bases for Interpreting Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1980).
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IV. CONCLUSION
It has been my aim in this Article, not to solve equal protection problems,
but to show what those problems are given various views of what equal
protection is. Some problems-those concerning what constitutional interpre-
tation is and whether it is necessary-are problems for any theory of equal
protection. So too are the problems of identifying the moral theory or theories
on which equal protection rests and specifying equal protection's relation-as
a full or partial embodiment, and as an ultimate principle or an intermediate
rule-to that theory or those theories and to other constitutional clauses.
Other problems are unique to nonoptional theories (for example, what deci-
sions remain for the democratic branches except instrumental ones?); still
others are unique to optional theories (for example, the problem of not "freez-
ing" government into one of the optional theories, the problem of identifying
proper compromises between or among optional theories, and the problem of
intermediate mistakes). I have not canvassed all possible problems, even all
possible problems at the theoretical level at which I have been dealing. But I
hope that I have identified the major theoretical problems and provided the
framework for future discourse on equal protection theory. z'7
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